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ABSTRACT
OUTPUT MEASURES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Clifford Ross Cope
Submitted to the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
on May 12, 1972
in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for
the degree of Master of City.Planning
The thesis is concerned with the type of output measures which
should by systematically collected by government to assist in resource-
management decisions.
The programming-planning-budgetary system vogue with its promise
of efficient resource allocation within government neglected government
efficiency for analysis of government policy. As a result, PPBS neither
brought about efficiency nor did-it have significant policy impact.
The major deficiency in local government is an effective manage-
ment control process for translatina administration goals through the
executive. While such a process faces peculiar difficulties in govern-
ment, these are not conceptually insuperable. What are required are
production measures suitable for use in management appraisal. The
type and comprehensiveness of the measures which would be suitable are
commonly misrepresented. A management control process can, however,
rely on quite informal information flows to supplement relatively formal
measures.
Criteria for production measures which could be used in the manage-
ment control process of local government departments are suggested.
There is an inverse relationship between the accuracy, ease of collection,
and ease of auditing of measures and the correlation of these measures
with overall organizational goals. PPBS made no attempt to analyze
this tradeoff. The most suitable measures for governments are multi-
variate measures rather than single-measures.
For major local government departments, production measures suit-
able for a management control system are reviewed. Most city departments
do not report even a fraction of the minimum measures required for a full
il
control system in their budget reports. It seems that the management
control system in such departments is correspondingly ill-developed.
The obstacles to implementation of management control systems in
local government appear to be practical rather than conceptual. It
seems that the pessimistic conclusions of the incrementalists such as
Lindblom, that government resists systematization and shuns open
reporting, are the main causes of the present inadequate development
of management control measuring in local government.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
It is a commonplace that government is less efficient than
business; that it produces less value with its share of resources than
would a business performing the same tasks with the same share of
resources. This has always been a source of citizen complaint against
government and at times during the last 100 years there have been major
movements to improve government efficiency.
It is difficult to quantify the exact degree of inefficiency in
government since there are no accepted measures of the value of
government output and certainly no measures of the income distributive
impacts of government but there are several indications that government
production is less than fully efficient. Inflation figures show that
government is costing steadily more in proportion to the rest of the
*genemy productivity figures suggest a long-term sluggishness in man-
hoyr productivity in government; where government does compete with
private firms It Is often more costly for similar output.
According to a recent article by Fisher (1971) government sector
output has been inflating in cost at twice the rate of inflation in
the general economy. In the government sector, state and local
government have been leading this trend.
.rater productivity measures are notoriously unreliable and
partleularly so where production cannot be valued as in government.
1
2However, indications are that in government as a whole productivity
has been sluggish and that there has been a dearth of technological
innovation in the whole government sector. Kendrick (1961, p.31 8)
quotes manpower and capital employed data for the period 1910 - 1957
that show a steady of slightly falling capital/manpower ratio for the
government sector at the same time that the private sector of the
economy doubled its capital/manpower ratio.
Government does directly compete with private sector institutions
in a few areas of health care, education, and fire prevention on more
or less equal terms - i.e. it makes no significant attempt to serve a
restricted clientele. Of all hospitals in Massachusetts in 1971, those
with the greatest cost rise over 1970 were the state and municipal
hospitals. Some towns in the Southwest have turned over fire protection
to private companies for considerable cost savings with no attendant
rise in insurance rates or fire losses. Even in education, although
an OEO report has declared incentive contracts to produce no worthwhile
improvement in educational achievement, there remain some examples of
outstandin'g successes by profit-makina firms (Leninger, 1970).
These examples are, of course not reliable indications of
inefficiency in government since they may hide changes in a major
variable, quality of output. In the absence of systematically
collected measures to the contrary, it seems plausible that quality of
government output has not risen in step with other sectors of the
economy - policemen may now ride patrol cars rather than walk on foot
but they no longer try doors.
3The presumption is strong that government does not deliver the
output that it could attain by more efficient use of Its resources.
In municipal government there have been three major movements to
reform this state of affairs - the Reform movement of the 1900's,
the efficiency movement of the 1920's and 1930's and, most recently,
a PPBS effort in the 1960's. All of these three were concerned with
increasing the effectiveness of local government, each though in very
different ways.
The Reform movement in the 1900's saw the foundation of the
reform clubs, including the National Municipal League. It was a
movement essentially directed against corruption in municipal govern-
ment - its interest in finance was largely concerned with introducing
effective auditing and strengthening the executive budget.
The 1920's and 1930's saw a movement towards efficiency in local
government - according to Clarence Ridley,
"A generation ago a municipal government was considered
commendable if it was honest. Today we demand a great
deal more of our public services. It must not only be
honest but efficient as well" (Ridley, C.E. and Simon,
H.A., 1938)
The movement is particularly important for the present thesis in that
it was the major period of development of measures of municipal
output; since the 1930's there has been virtually no development of
new responsibility measures for municipal output.
Since 1965 the pressure for efficiency in government has been
focused on the implementation of PPBS, programming, planning, budgeting
systems. Developed at the Department of Defense and introduced to local
governments through the 5-5-5 project, PPBS has aimed at introducing
I.
policy analysis to governments.
None of these three movements can be said to have succeeded. The
reform movement of the 1900's died away; only a few cities and then
only a few departments in those cities stand out as having implemented
the proposals of the efficiency movement of the 1920's; PPBS likewise
seems to have been checked.
This thesis is concerned with one of the major elements of these
reform movements - the measurement of the output of government services.
It contends that recent attempts at devising output measures for local
government services have been misguided and that this misdirection stems
from a concept of the management process most clearly realized in the
federal model PPBS. The thesis contends that the output measures most
urgently required for a local government are accountability measures
useful for motivating department and agency heads of the local govern-
ment, i.e. management control measures for controlling their performance
and use of resources. The thesis suggests how such measures might fit
into the resource-allocation process of a local government; what the
desirable characteristics of such measures are; and how such measures
might be developed. The thesis reviews the usefulness of measures of
local government output presently available and the practices of major
cities in using these measures.
The body of the thesis is divided into five chapters: a chapter
discussing the PPB system; a chapter on the management control process
in government and its relation to efficiency; a chapter on devising
performance measures and their present use in the control process. The
thesis concludes with a summary and a bibliography.
5Although the thesis is concerned particularly with local government
functions, much of the discussion is relevant to the greater part of
the government and non-profit sector of the economy, or at least the
larger organizations in this sector. Accordingly, in chapters of the
thesis the terms government, local government and municipal government
are interchangeable.
CHAPTER 11
Efficiency, Analysis and PPBS
An individual can be said to be efficient when he is producing the
maximum value possible with the resources available to him. For an
organization such as government the same definition applies to the
overall performance of the organization. However, securing efficiency
In an organization requires that the individuals in the organization
act efficiently. Accordingly an organization secures efficiency by
determining the value of products, by allocating resources to different
products in proportion to the marginal value of production, and by
maintaining efficiency in each production line. Over and above the
efficiency problem confronting the individual, the organization has the
problem of coordination.
The most recent efficiency movement in government has been
associated with the name PPBS. Here PPBS is understood as defined by
the presence of two elements in budgetary procedures: a program-
oriented budget and a requirement for the submission of issue analyses
with budget requests. Many systems of government reform have been in
effect that ignore these elements but have still been entitled PPBS,
for example, in New York City and Wisconsin. These are neglected here.
Introduced in the Department of Defense, PPBS was introduced to
the whole Federal government in 1965. Since that time the efficiency
drive in government has been riding on the fate of PPBS in the govern-
ments into which it has been introduced. Local government attempts
6
7at PPBS were focused by the Federally funded '5-5-5' project (Sub-
committee on Economy in Government, 1969), although dating from
before 1965 (Schick, 1971). Subsequently several cities made changes
along PPBS or claimed PPBS lines in their administrative practices,
notably Dade County, Florida (Miami), Philadelphia, Dayton, Ohio and
New York City.
The goals of PPBS were nothing if not ambitious. Fred Hoffman
of the Bureau of the Budget, the person actually responsible for the
day-to-day oversight of the Federal PPBS, stated the goals of PPBS
as roughly equivalent to those of securing efficiency given above:
"The system (PPBS) was introduced to improve Federal
decision-making about resource-allocation in several
important ways. The system is designed to
- Improve the efficiency of alternative ways of
controlling government resource-using or resource-
affecting activities as the market tests the efficiency
of private resource allocations.
- Relate...to the proper objectives of public action.
- Present major issues for decision in a useful way to
high officials." (Hoffman, 1969, p. 850)
The first objective roughly corresponds to the translation of
efficiency throughout the organization, the second corresponds to
estimating the need for and the value of programs, and the third
objective corresponds roughly to assisting the allocation of resources.
However, PPBS as realized did not give equal weight to each of
these objectives. PPBS was, in the event, heavily concerned with
Hoffman's objectives two and three to the neglect of maintenance of
efficiency throughout the organization. This reflected its concentra-
tion on improving the process of valuing the output of government.
The concept is most extremely stated in the PPBS literature by
8Greenhouse (1970, p. 895):
"the President and Congress would gain the means of
regulating the Federal production apparatus and of
optimizing the benefit/cost margin across the full
range of Federal outputs."
The implications of determining the 'proper objectives of public
action' and the size of the government sector rationally are clear.
PPBS then became the vehicle for the benefit/cost analyses that would
enable governments to reach optimality. Analysis was crucial in order
to determine the proper objectives for government; linking these
analyses to the budget would give the analysts muscle to implement
their decisions.
In fact the linkage went the other way. PPBS has failed in all
the governments into which it has been introduced. It seems that the
examples of governments claiming some success with PPBS have been
precisely those governments using 'PPBS' along other lines than those
claimed above. (Schick, 1971). It is not the purpose of this thesis
to dissect this failure, but the failure of PPPS does not represent a
failure for the efficiency movement except in so far as efficiency was
linked to attempts to define the size of the government sector.
Observers concerned with the failure of PPBS (Wildavsky, 1969; Schick,
1971; Schultze, 1969; Hinrichs, 1969) seem to agree that this linkage
of analysis to the budget was fatal for analysis. Linked to the
routine of the budget, analysis was unable to avoid being humdrum.
Without analysis, the decisions being made were no different than
before; PPBS had failed.
9"Budgeting comes to esteem and rely on that which can be
routinised; the things that can be routinised are often
matters pertaining to the operations of public agencies
rather than to outside events. A Gresham's Law is at
work driving out analysis." (Schultze, 1968, p. 18)
"PPBS discouraged policy analysis. To collect vast amounts
of random data is hardly a serious analysis of public
policy. The conclusion is obvious. The shotgun marriage
between policy analysis and budgeting should be annulled."
(Wildavsky, 1970, p. 846)
R. N. Anthony's (1965) classification of management decision-making
Into three types - operations control, management control, and strategic
planning - is commonly recognized as a convenient structure for explain-
ing the clash between analysis and budgeting. It is less commonly
recognized as suggesting avenues for approach to the efficiency problem
In government.
Operational control decisions are in Anthony's words:
"The process of ensuring that specific tasks are carried
out efficiently and effectively" (1965, p. 18)
Such decisions are routine, frequent production decisions, typically
taken by lower levels in the hierarchy of an organization. Such decisions
Include the allocation of personnel to their tasks, the detection of
fraud in an accounting system, and the purchase of equipment. Most
current budgetary systems are organized as operational control systems
devoted to ensuring that money is spent only for the intended purposes
and have little to do with determining how these purposes should be
set, or if the purposes are achieved, or the value of these purposes.
The information systems set up for such a budgetary system does not
therefore support decision-making for any of these latter goals.
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"Management control is the process by which managers ensure
that resources are obtained and used effectively in the
accomplishment of the organization's objectives." (1465, p. 17)
Decisions here include hiring and firing of staff, production
technology, pricing, location of service outlets, formulating budgets,
capital financing, measuring and appraising management performance,
i.e. decisions typically taken by middle management, at least in the
business firm. [n most state and local governments such decisions
are commonly the prerogative of the legislature rather than the
executive but the executive will typically have a good deal of influ-
ence on the decisions. In management control at least is included
one of the major criteria given for efficient government, viz.
concern with the translation of administrative objectives through
the organi zation.
Strategic planning corresponds to PPBS planning:
"... the process of deciding on objectives of the organisa-
tion on changes in these objectives, on the resources used
to attain these objectives, and on the process governing
the acquisition, use and disposition of these resources."
(1965, p.16).
It concerns long-range planning (except where this is trend
extrapolation) , the monitoring of environmental changes likely to
affect the organization, and the setting of organizational policy to
operate in this environment. In government such decisions as the
busing decision, decldihg to offer welfare relief, represent deci-
sions taken at the strategic planning level. Typically such deci-
sions are entirely the prerogative of the legislature, with only
limited advice from the executive.
11
Anthony particularly stresses the distinctiveness of strateqic
planning. It is asystematic, acyclical, and creative; it responds
to events external to the organization; it relies upon information
on events external to the organization. As such it will defy
routinization. Accordingly, in terms of this classification the
linkage of analysis (strategic planning) to the budget (operational
control) In government was likely to result in the overload of both
operational control and strategic planning systems with information
irrelevant to both.
Anthony's classification is essentially based on the assertion
that organizations are segreaated in order to achieve these three
purposes. The pursuit of efficiency as defined above lies in an
area, management control, not corresponding to the primary focus
of PPBS, viz. strategic planning. Going beyond Anthony for non-
profit organizations and governments, strategic planning does not
have simple goals in governments and hence is always likely to remain
the prerogative of the legislature. As such it will remain separated
from executive processes.
[n contrast certain of the participants of the original PPBS
movement appeared to have thought that this segregation might not
be necessary. Schultze, for instance, declares (p.5-6 , 1968) that the
functions of a budget were:
"financial control.... insuring that public funds are spent
only for those purposes specified only by law.. .management
control. .. programming the use of resources,...manpower,
equipment, transportation, and the like...to carry out an
appropriate set of activities in an efficient manner.
strategic planning... .determination of the kind and level of
activities that management control seeks to carry out effi-
clently."
12
In other words a single budget can be all of Anthony's three types.
It is clear that Schultze misinterprets the Anthony classification.
His'management control 'is concerned primarily with task management
rather than the motivation of managers; the activities that he
describes are all concerned with tasks rather than managers and
cover only a fractional part of management control. His definition
of strategic planning stresses a neat dovetalling with management
control and operational control. It seems that Schultze was following
Schick (1966) in identifying the Anthony categories with chapters
In the history of budgeting rather than in the actual decision-making.
Contrary therefore to the hopes of some of the participants in
the PPBS movement it seems that the area of profitable systematization
of analysis is restricted. Furthermore it seems that systematization
of analysis cannot be expected to bring efficiency in its wake.
PPBS as implemented in the Federal government cannot be achieved.
CHAPTER III
Management Control and its Characteristics in Governments
Efficiency Within An Organization
At the beginning of Chapter II, it was asserted that three condi-
tions were necessary for saying that an organization acts efficiently:
valuation of products, allocating resources to different products in
proportion to the marginal value of production, and translating
efficiency to each product line. More formal proofs of these assertions
suggest how a government may set out to secure these conditions.
The problem of efficiency is a particularly acute one for
socialist economies for here the allocation of resources by a free market
is to be replaced by allocation in line with social preferences as
opposed to individual preferences. All economics textbooks present
the conditions under which the private sector of the economy will be
efficient and effective. However, derivation of comparable conditions
for the public sector of the economy and the internal management of
organizations, where individual advantage is not directly linked to
the advantage of the sector or the organization, is less widely
discussed. Work on models of efficient socialist economies is
directly relevant both to the within-organization behaviour of business
firms and to the resource allocation of governments.
Debate on the efficiency of socialist economies was focused in
the 1930's by the debates of Von Mieses and Oskar Lange (Lange, 1936),
the chief concern of the debate being whether a socialist economy could
13
possibly be efficient. After 1936 the debate paused. Oskar Lange had
shown that a set of socially-determined preferences could be Imposed
on an economy and the economy could still reach a maximum of utility
through the action of "social profit" maximizing decision agents
within the economy. However, to all practical intent the problem
remained insoluble except by the restriction of the number of decision-
making agents in the economy. However, in the 1960's there have been
devised a new set of planning procedures, closely related to those of
Lange, which seem much more practicable as a means of allocating
resources, and illustrate the interlinking of these three conditions
given. for efficiency more practically. This work is associated
with Arrow and Hurwicz at Harvard, and Malinvaud at Berkeley. However,
here reference is made to a process proposed by Heal. (Heal, l969).
Heal discusses a procedure which is directly applicable to local
government, or indeed to a central government or a non-profit organiza-
tion. It is postulated that the economy has a pre-set utility function
Involving the different products of the socialist economy. The
economy involves producing units, producing goods for final consump-
tion or for intermediate demand. There exists a central planning
board which itself does not directly produce but which directs the
allocation of resources to the different operating units. Each
producing unit has a different production possibility set. The goal
of the planning procedure is twofold: to share out the resources
between each production unit to maximize the economy's utility
function and to motivate managers to cooperate in this process and
use resources efficiently.
15
The procedure is quite simple. The central planning board offers
an initial allocation of resources to firms and successively firms
report what they will produce for marginal adjustments to these
resource allocations. The central planning board adjusts its resource
allocations in proportion to the marginal value of a firm's production.
At each step, managers are rewarded according to the "social profit"
of their production. Heal shows that such a gradient procedure will
converge on at least a local optimum of utility for the economy and that
managers will be motivated to produce efficiently - not to waste
resources and to maximize social utility for the resource allocation
given.
It is necessary to make a correction to the Heal model. Like
Malinvaud and Arrow and Hurwicz, Heal assumes that managers can be
directed to report accurately their production and what they will
produce for marginal adjustments to their resource allocations.
However, for the reward function used for managers - i.e. proportional
to the marginal value of their total production - it is in managers'
interest to mis-report to the center their production targets and to
engage in lobbying for more resources than warranted by the value of
their production. An adjustment must be made to the reward function.
In particular, managers must not only be rewarded in proportion to
the marginal value of their total production, they must also be
penalized if their targets were not accurate, whether under-estimated
or, more likely, over-estimated. Depending upon the size of the
penalty, It can be shown in the model that managers can always be made
to lose if they do not report accurately while still being encouraged
16
to produce the maximum of social utility for their allocated resources.
The Heal model and the other gradient models of socialist
economies are important for the resource-using activities of government.
The Heal model can be directly applied to a local government case in
which firms in the economy become departments and agencies in a local
government while the central planning board is the power of the
government to raise revenues to support its operations. The problem
is then much simpler than in the economy at large: there need be only
one resource allocated, viz. revenues, since factors of production can
be purchased in the outside market; there are in general far fewer bud-
getary units than in the whole economy.
It seems utopian to advocate the use of a procedure similar to
this in the government sector - specification of a utility function is
beyond the capacity of any realistic political process. There are
examples though of public sector enterprises using similar reward
functions to motivate production. Performance contracting in
education (Lessinger, 1971) is the most recent example.
The procedure does show sufficient conditions for efficiency of
allocation which may be replicated in many organizations. As Heal
points out, a variety of different institutional settings would fit
the model as a model of socialist planning. (Heal, 1969, p. 361).
The model demonstrates that efficiency can be secured with a system
which is very skeletal indeed. A sufficient process for efficiency
requires:
1. knowledge of outputs communicated to central authorities
17
2. motivation of departments in proportion to the value of
their production to central administration
3. and their budgeting accuracy
4. allocation of resources in proportion to the marginal contribu-
tion of a department to central administration's value
Should any of theseconditions not be met, then the procedure will
not attain a maximum of utility and managers will not attain a
maximum reward.
Quite a skeletal system for firstly, it is not necessary that
central administration know the production functions for each department,
and secondly, it is not even necessary that the department managers
have any precise knowledge of their production possibility set at
least initially for they will be strongly motivated to learn more
about the production possibility set. These are ideal conditions for
a decentralized organization. By using the information distributed
throughout the organization, the organization attains the same maximum
utility which it would have attained had all decisions been centrally
taken. The second point emphasizes that sophisticated knowledge of
the production possibility set, such as would be derived in the local
government case from comparisons of the records of several local
authorities, is not necessary, even though it would be useful to both
budgeteer and budgetee.
Attainment of these conditions within the organization will not,
however, guarantee that the organization is beneficial to society.
The government can be internally efficient but not produce the outputs
that society requires. This is the distinction made by Anthony. As
pointed out in Chapter II, PPBS was designed with one eye on ensuring
18
that government was socially beneficial. The planning procedures
discussed stress, however, that even If the politIcl process,
assisted or unassisted by analysis, has ensured that government has
beneficial goals, without the securing of the efficiency criteria
discussed here and in Chapter II, government will not attain these
goals efficiently and may well not attain them at all. Moreover, the
key to the attainment of efficiency is the measurement of government
production.
The Management Control Process
Obtaining the conditions required in the discussion above is the
concern in the Anthony classification of management control -
motivating management to perform efficiently and effectively. The
best short description of a management control process is given in
Anthony (1970, ch. 14-17).
Anthony stresses the working of the management control system as
a negative feedback loop designed to keep management decisions in line
with administration policies. The process requires the identification
of responsibility centers - sections of the firm headed by a single
responsible person with distinct resource-using and service-producing
duties. In a firm, examples of responsibility centers might be the
sales division, the car lines salesman, the line foreman, and even
the welder, In governments such responsibility centers can similarly
be recognized: for instance in a school system responsibility extends
from the superintendent, the principals to the individual teachers.
19
These responsibility centers are then the foci of a cyclical
management control process (Anthony, 1970, p. 424). Anthony sketches
a loop from budgeting (allocating resources), monitoring the uses
of the resources and the output from these resources by each responsi-
bility center; appraisal and evaluation of the use made of resources,
and motivation of managers on the basis of these appraisals. The
essential tool of management control is the variance report, testing
actual performance against some standard of expected performance.
The goals of the process is to motivate managers to act in accordance
with the goals of administration. Anthony shows administration
policies as impinging on the management control process through the
budget, when resource allocations are affected by the policies of
administration, as well as by observed efficiencies.
It should be stressed that the degree of formality in these
processes is quite flexible. As Forrester points out (Forrester, lq8),
the information used in running an organization is predominantly
informal. Likewise much of the evaluation of production, and perform-
ance appraisal in the management control process can be informal.
Motivation can be directly via such means as salaries or promotion
or it can be informally by peer review. Standards can be derived by
comparisons with other similar organizations, by comparison with the
history of the organization itself, or even by a simple process of
negotiation. The standards can be laid down formally by administration,
or administration can acquiesce in the use of professional standards.
A well run management control system has several benefits; not
only those of a rise in productivi.ty and efficiency but also the
20
indirect benefits of a "Hawthorne effect". In addition, as the
highest level of systematic monitoring of production in the organiza-
tion, management control provides basic Information on organizational
capabilities to the strategic planning process. This is true,
whether in a large organization's management control system of formal
variance reports and remote supervision or in the person-person
contact system of the smallest organization.
Creation of an effective management control system is not
without its difficulties, however. It is difficult for administration
to impose all its preferences on management. Inter-management competi-
tion for resources promoted by such a system can produce destructive
use of centrally supplied resources such as auditing and makes for
strong attempts to beat the system. Management may have goals
considerably different from those of administration and may baulk an
administratively imposed system. In particular professional associa-
tions can be expected to have their own goals of service which
transcend the goals of the individual organization and to be accordingly
reluctant to accept organizational goals. An example in local govern-
ment might be in public health departments, where medical prestige
might be concentrated in relatively unproductive areas for public
health. The management control process is unlikely to operate
effectively where standards are not carefully defined and fairly
stable. In the Heal model, if the central planning board's utility
function were to change sharply during the planning process, then
managers will gain by second-guessing the center's utility function and
mis-reporting their marginal contributions to utility. The management
21
control process, while not insulated from administration policy should
at least be not subject to constant interference. hirdly, the
management control process does require clear definition of responsi-
bilities. The goal is to motivate individuals to perform efficiently
and effectively by rewarding them and penalizing them. If they
cannot be held responsible for any set of products then the rewards
are less effective.
The Management Control Process in Government
Few governments have even the rudiments of a formal management
control system. Budgeting is commonly quite divorced from management
control and considerations of efficient/effective performance. Crecine
(1968) has shown how the decision-making power in a large city differs
drastically from the model of Anthony; that there is no formal considera-
tion of efficiency or effectiveness before committing resources to a
department; that budgeting is a negotiation with last year's budget
as a base point for the budget/ In almost all cases, governments
make no use of variance reports. Where they are used, the variances
reported are simply expenditure variances. Motivation is rarely
linked to performance. Civil Service provides for strict seniority,
veteran's preference rules and gives only slight attention to on-the-
Job evaluations. Examinations supposed to measure on-the-job
performance are only accurate for typists and keypunchers; evaluations
by superiors can be absolutely subjective. Little if any information
Is collected on the production of government. As will be shown in
22
Chapter V, the information is rarely if ever used in within-organization
decision-making. In such a situation performance can only drift at a
low level; government can only be unresponsive to administration.
In part this does reflect peculiar difficulties in management
control in government. Professional associations are commonly
important in government agencies; doctors or lawyers in government
service share standards with their counterparts in private practice,
others such as librarians or teachers have their independent standards
of quality. These goals often clash with community preferences and
are accompanied by attitudes of service at any price. More than in
any business firm, the goals of the government are a matter of debate
a'nd political resolution. (Lindblom, 1063). This debate leaves In
many areas little consensus on what government should achieve and even
what the significant areas of achievement are. In Anthony's terms
the strategic planning debate extends well down into the organization.
Typically in governments too, responsibilities are diffuse, programs
overlap, production's effectiveness is poorly known and the private
sector often provides similar or complementary products.
However, these factors do not compel the poor development of
management control in government. Even with Civil Service rules,
local government could begin to stress performance and to systematize
management control. Government organizations like profit-making
organizations have responsibility centers. While Civil Service may
make motivation through promotion and salary boosts difficult in
most governments, it seems that peer review pressures may be reinforced
by the strong esteem deriving from the concept of public service.
Professionalism does at least promote debate about service being
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provided. Although political debate and interference do cover large
areas of resource allocation, nevertheless there are wide areas of
agreement on what the important dimensions of government agencies are
and what missions government agencies should focus on. Even where,
as in education, there is a more or less continual debate on the
goals of the educational system, nevertheless several areas of
consensus on methods remain. Even here an informal management
cgntrol process relying on internally generated 'standards' could
focus debate.
For there are some notable examples of successful implementations
of highly informal management control systems in agencies where
consensus on production value is extremely unlikely ever to prevail.
For example, a recent article in the Harvard Business Review
(Macleod, 1972) discusses a 'PPBS' system in a mental health work
clinic, with strong emphasis on management control although in a non-
threatening context. Each professional in the clinic received a report
of how his time per case compared with the average time required per
gase of the particular type, The result was a strong motivation among
the professionals to bring their time per case In line with the
pFgfessional norm, without at the same time 'rate-busting' by spending
t@9 little time per case. The result was a considerable gain in
throughput of cases with no change in quality of treatment in the
opinion of the professionals. The clinic Itself had become more
@fficient. In the circumstances a program budget could come Into Its
@wn, Resources could be allocated to programs In the assurance that
there was likely to be no loss of efficiency with the changed
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allocation. As will be discussed in Chapter V, there are many
departments in government where, although there will be no consensus
on the value of different programs, nevertheless efficiency can be
assured by introduction of such a skeletal management control program
based on a simple workload measure, professional control over
quality, and a program budget.
Production Measures
In Chapter 11, it was pointed out that information on results
was useful in all areas of decision-making in the Anthony classification.
Information on the results of organizational actions is, however,
particularly the province of the management control system. Strategic
planning is primarily concerned with information on events external
to the organization; strategic planning itself is not primarily
concerned with monitoring organizational performance. Operational
control uses information remote from the missions of the organization.
To make efficient resource allocation decisions, it is essential to
know how efficiently these resources will be used by the responsibility
center receiving them. It is highly unproductive to allocate resources
to a methadone program if, as strategic planning reports, there are
no addicts in the city; it is also highly unproductive to allocate
resources to a methadone program which will cure no one.
Small organizations may collect sufficient information informally
on management control for their needs, but without a formal collection
system management control information on organizational capabilities
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will not be available for administration. Before most government
organizations can become efficient, the collection of production
measures at the management control level is required. These in
turn will supply information required for strategic planning and
resource allocation. What is not required is a performance budgeting
system along the lines remembered by Schick and Schultze of
measuring tasks, but a system to measure responsibility center
performance. Management control is essential for efficiency; it is
essential for resource allocation. Development of management control
systems and their attendant performance assessment systems is the
first priority in most governments.
In Chapter IV, the problems of measuring the production of
government agencies is discussed. The different types of measures
available are considered and methods of devising suitable efficiency
measures are discussed. In addition, recent emphases on output
measures are criticized. In Chapter V, measures suitable for
management control in major departments are discussed, together with
the present use of these measures. The conclusion of the chapter is
that while there are usually a considerable number of measures avail-
able for management control these are rarely if ever used.
CHAPTER IV
Choosing Measures of Production
Introduction
Selection of appropriate production measures for governments is
a major technical problem, yet its solution is important. As the models
of Chapter III show, the difference between good measures and bad
measures for management control is the difference between optimal and
sub-optimal performance.
Underlying much of the discussion of production measures (e.g.
Hinrichs, 1970; Hatry, 1970) has been a systems view of oroanizations -
that an organization or a government department is a system for
converting inputs into outputs. Accordingly there is a nice division
of measures convenient to hand: the organization can be measured with
respect to its inputs, to the state of the system - its production
technology - and in terms of its outputs. Thus a school district may
be measured by its inputs, which include teachers, money, classroom
space; by its production technology which includes, say, modern math
versus traditional math teaching; or by its outputs, which include
pupils with particular skills. At each level there are different
measures: an input measure might be expenditure per pupil, a
technology measure might be curriculum offered, and output measure
might be numbers of people graduating with a particular gain in
reading age.
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From this model It is normally a short-step to decrying all
measures but 'output' measures and asserting the immediate priority
of devising 'output' measures and using only these as bases for
resource allocation.
Indeed the models of organization resource-allocation show that
measurement in terms of inputs and organizational design will yield
indifferent performance. Measuring inputs results in over-consumption
of factors, measurement of organizational type results in lack of
innovation. However, the models further suggest that the divisions
between inputs, system state and output may not be a necessary one
at the management control level even though It may be important at the
strategic planning level. Output for an electrical system or a
factory is quite simply measured - there is a restricted set of
sources of value from such a system. However, for an organization the
identification of value and output with a distinct product line may be
unduly restrictive; rather the output of the organization is that
which produced value to its clientele. The parents of school children
may be numbered among a school's clientele and they may find the school's
function as a day-care center to be valuable whereas they may find
certain aspects of the school's curriculum quite odious. In this
respect some measures of the school system that might otherwise be
considered input measures can be very useful in evaluation of the
school system - class size, for example, which according to the
Coleman report has no influence on scholastic attainment, may neverthe-
less have quite a share in what effect a school system is perceived to
have on pupil attainment and accordingly, for purposes of evaluating
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schools should be measured as a quality indicator. A court system
has no identifiable outputs but may have definite policies set for
it - observance of 'due procedure' for example, and should at the
management control level be evaluated with respect to these policies.
In this respect 'due procedure' is an output of the court system.
Accordingly, the model above suggests that for resource
allocation purposes a definition of output as value added is more
appropriate than the narrow product line definition typically assumed.
Before proceeding further it is necessary to discuss the concept
of measurability or ease of measurement. Ease of measurement is
related to two concepts - firstly, the type of scale on which measure-
ment is possible and secondly the objectivity of the measures, or the
ease of persuading people to accept the measure.
There are four types of scale on which measurement is possible:
nominal, ordinal, ratio and cardinal. Flexibility of mathematical
operations increases from nominal to cardinal scales. A nominal scale
consists of a simple classification - a go/nogo assignment of a
phenomena to a type. The scale is very commonly seen in political
debates; there is quality education or there is not quality education;
there Is a crime wave or there is not; drug addicts are bad people or
sick people. On an ordinal scale there is a definite ranking of the
phenomena. In a given city it is possible to rank schools in order
of quality by experienced supervisors and teachers, even if quality
cannot be exactly identified, or the observers do not easily agree
on what constitutes quality. A ratio scale is one in which it is
possible to measure distances between items, the distance being
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constant over the whole scale. Thus on the National Board of Fire
Underwriter's scale it is possible to say that a city graded 3 is
as much better than a city graded 5 as the latter is than a city
graded 7. However, a city graded 10 (the lowest grade on the scale)
is not a city with no fire protection nor is a city with a zero on the
scale a city with absolute fire protection. A cardinal scale
possesses all the properties of a ratio scale together with the
properties of having a definite zero. A city's traffic department
may ticket 1000 cars per day; it tickets twice as many cars as a city
ticketing only 500 a day. A city ticketing 0 cars per day has
performed no ticketing that day - the zero is a true zero. A city
spending $2 million on schools spends twice as much as a school
spending $1 million.
All things equal, it is preferable to have measurements on a
cardinal scale to other scales and so on down the list to nominal,
simply because a fuller range of mathematical operations is possible
with a cardinal scale than with other scales. However, it Is usually
not often practicable to rely exclusively on cardinal measures.
A key to any measurement is that it be objective, i.e. replicable
or at least a subject of agreement. Clearly when political debate
focuses on quality education there is no agreement among the debatants
on the exact meaning of the nominal assignment, quality. As such the
concept of quality is reduced to obscurantism. A measure must be
accepted as having value before it can be used in the resource alloca-
tion process. It Is thus easier to measure the sharply defined:
"does the police department have a 24-hour manned switchboard" than the
30
obscure "is the police department alert". Although the latter
represents the politically relevant question, the former is at
least a partial answer to the second and has the advantage of being
less ambiguously answerable. A concept such as quality of education
may involve underlying disagreements such that no agreement can be
achieved on the measurements appropriate for It whereas such lower
level measures as scores on attainment tests are more likely to be
accepted.
Classification of Production Measures
In any organization, and particularly in local government, there
is a hierarchy of output measures. This hierarchy corresponds fairly
closely to divisions of responsibility within the organization and
fairly closely moreover to Anthony's discussion of decision-making.
Passing down the hierarchy there is generally an inverse relationship
between measurability and relationship to the overall goals of the
organization. The goals of a major department may be very clear -
e.g. the police should reduce crime but measurement of this effect is
not easy for a change in crime rate cannot be attributed only to
police practices. At this level a measure of progress towards objectives
Is not availhble. In other comparable situations the goals may be
more obscure and measures even more difficult. In the case of the
public library, professionals always desire to upgrade the public's
reading material. Securing political acceptance of the goal and measur-
ing progress toward the goal are about equally difficult.
31 .
However, lower down the organization it is often possible to
devise very accurate measurements - the patrol division of the
police force's output can be measured very precisely in terms of
patrol-miles per night, number of alerts responded to, even response
time. However, such measures even though very precise may have no
connection at all with the overall goals of crime prevention and at
times even be counter-productive - as with police incidents sparking
off riots.
Here it is proposed that there is a classification of output
measures into three types: workload measures, performance measures,
and social indicators. The terms are not without confusing connota-
tions, as all of them are used in different contexts than used here,
but the connections with the present subject are sufficiently close
to make their use worthwhile.
Workload measures are usually simple volume indicators,
corresponding to the work of fairly low-level responsibility centers.
Such measures are numbers of inspections performed, numbers of lines typed,
number of arrests made, number of rate demands issued, number of cases
handled. Such measures clearly are easily measurable but have no
necessary relationship to the overall goals of the organization.
The building department may carry out many shoddy inspections,overlooking
most of the violations actually present, or may carry out a few
thorough inspections detecting all violations. Control by a mere
workload measure ignores the purpose of inspections.
Performance measures represent a higher level of measurement.
The term performance is perhaps unfortunate in view of the association
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with performance budgeting: the performance measures used in perform-
ance budgeting were not true performance measures; rather they were
somewhat puny workload measures. Performance measures here refers to
measures suitable for use in management control and appraising effi-
ciency. Such measures usually control not only for quantity of produc-
tion but also for quality of production. Performance measures corres-
pond to responsibilities of middle management. For a business it is
generally possible to translate the overall profit goals of the company
into profit goals for these middle-level responsibility centers - by a
careful accounting system on profit center lines. In government this
is much more difficult and the performance of any single department
need not bear any one-to-one relationship with the overall goals of
the government. Thus a fairly useful measure for police department
performance is percent of crimes resulting in assignment of guilt,
weighted by average sentence for the crime - measuring both the
effectiveness of police in solving and detecting crimes and apprehend-
ing criminals and maintaining a quality check on the work. However,
the measure is not necessarily related to reductions in crime rates
although the connection is plausible.
Social indicators are those measures which are most closely
related to valuing the output of the organization. The term social
Indicator is generally used for quantitative indicators of major
changes in society such as crime rates or GNP. See Bauer (1967) for
discussion of these measures. Such measures are affected by the work
of government organizations - indeed the phenomena that they measure,
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education, crime, culture, are often the prime reasons for the
government programs. However, in general, a government does not
have control over these measures. Crime rates are a prime example.
Crime itself depends (plausibly, though not proven) on the work of
the police, the courts, the penitentiaries, as well as upon such
exogenous factors as poverty, charitable and religious organizations,
anomie, strength of private crime protection - i.e. any number of
overlapping factors. It would be hard to separate out these overlapping
effects and indeed no successful criminological research has yet
done so.
The social indicators presently available are moreover not
accurate at measuring the phenomena that they purport to measure.
GNP ignores many of the considerations associated with a satisfactory
life; crime rate ignores many instances of criminal behaviour; indeed
It sidesteps the issue of defining criminality.
Social indicators are therefore not useful for control purposes
but are chiefly useful in estimating needs for government programs.
Clearly this classification is not absolute - crime rates, for
the police and the courts are not merely social indicators but also
workload measures, useful in budgeting for patrol strength. Several
other classifications could be devised and output measures broken
down into several more categoriesthan the three given here, even based
as here on the observed inverse correlation of measurability and
relevance to overall organizational goals. Others could be developed
tied to other theories of management of organizations. However, the
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present classification, based on Anthony's decision-making classifica-
tion, does serve to support that classificatloti. There are very
different purposes to which production measure; can be put and
different measures are appropriate for different purposes.
Requirements for Management Control Measures
Returning to Chapter III it can be seen that the essentials for
measures useful in management control are that there be some measure
of volume and some of quality of output provided. The conditions for
such output measures are quite stringent. Not all output measures
would be suitable for use in the budgetary model given - allocating
resources to the police on the basis of their ;ocial indicator, crime
rates, without any supplementary efficiency meqsure would be a license
for crisis management.
Several criteria should be considered in devising measures for
management control.
Firstly the quantity measured must as far as possible have a cause-
effect relationship with the work of the responsibility center controlled.
Thus educational attainment is affected by the work of the school
bystem ut taken alone it Is not a suitable measure for management
gentrol in the school system, since the educational attainment itself
is most highly correlated with socio-economic kackground rather than
schooling. Even other city agencies could havn some effect on attain-
ment, e.g. the library department; it is not within the competence of
the school system to affect attainment measuret drastically. Attempts
to charge educational attainment scores to a 'zchool principal or a
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district supervisor would result in speedy disillusionment.
Secondly, the measurement involved must be relatively precise
If it is to be credible (and to be easily checked for tampering).
While a figure for the number of narcotics addicts in a city may be
accepted without demur in a strategic planning debate, it is unlikely
to pass unchallenged when used to appraise the contribution being made by
the city's methadone program to reduce the numbers of addicts, with the
jobs of program directors in the balance. This relates to the
objectivity problem discussed above - the measurement need not, however,
require detailed agreement on the exact nature of the entities being
counted, but often some peer-review ranking will he accepted.
Thirdly, a measure on a responsibility center should as far as
possible be timely - it should be available as quickly as possible
after the event measured. Thus in evaluating a recreation program it
may well be necessary to wait 10 to 20 years to observe how the
clients of the program turn out as citizens in society, but for at
least the time span of the program some measure of output of the
program, such as specific entertainments provided or numbers of
children registering in the program (reflecting demand for the
program) is necessary.
Fourthly, the measure should match some responsibility center
in the organization. This, while not essential, id vonbrnirny. Thus
the National Board of Fire Insurance Underwriter's grading schedules
gives an overall rating of a city's fire risk involving appraisal of
areas of responsibility for the fire department, building code
department, planning department, and the water department, as well as
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appraising various natural characteristics of the city. However,
the grading schedule can be broken down by department and the
contribution of each department to the overall grading thus evaluated.
By contrast a measure such as crime rate cannot be yet apportioned
between the various departments and natural factors concerned with
crime control.
Fifthly, a measure for management control will be monitored, it
Is anticipated, fairly regularly and as such should be fairly cheap
to collect. Thus it is desirable for many city departments to
measure attendance at many of their functions - the recreation/parks
department being the prime example. However, any accurate count of
attendance would be too expensive to collect in most cases. Normally
It is desirable if a measure is collected as part of an already
Installed records system, as some operational control system.
Sixthly, a measure should be part of a system of balances and
checks on accuracy. The problem is one which Webb, Campbell and others
discuss (1966) for social science research. People behave differently
when they are being measured - indeed the purpose of management control
is to set up strong motivations to behave differently and to perform
In the best light possible under the measurements. Webb and Campbell
discuss how to devise measurements which are either Imperceptible or
will not be reacted to; in management control the problem is to
devise measurements which will be reacted to in the desired direction
and which will not be tampered with. The most elementary principles of
auditing systems should always be applied to measures used In
management control since there is almost always strong motivation to
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interfere with the statistics. At present there are few checks on
the accuracy of crime rate figures. With a strengthening of the
management control system, it could be anticipated that motivation
to alter these f igures, to report accurately or inaccurately, could
be increased by the very presence of the control systems. If, as
at presentthe control system associates bigger budgets with higher
crime rates, there might be an incentive to overstate the crime rate
figures. In a future system where this figure is no longer the focus
but the major figure controlled is percentage of crimes cleared by
arrest, then motivation would shift to either reducing reports of
uncleared crimes (a doubtful move since this would involve interfering
with previously compiled books) or to increase the number of arrests.
The accountant's system of debits and credits has the great
advantage of making different sections of the data collection system
the responsibility of different persons while making it possible for
third parties to detect disagreements between different parts of the
system. While accounting systems do have the advantage that all flows
In the system can be reduced to a common unit, many output measure
systems could at least in part be set up as this part of a system and
divided between responsibility centers. For instance, a unified
crime reporting system could have three major accounts - crime
reported, arrest made, and guilt assigned - each account maintained
separately. Inspection systems lend themselves quite easily to
auditing systems of a different kind Involving experimental designs
to compare different inspectors against each other and detect
deficiencies in inspection.
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These six criteria imply quite stringent restrictions on the
output measures suitable for use in government departments. It may
seem that several departments are not susceptible of management
control measurement. Education is the obvious example: no quantity
has seriously been accepted as a parameter solely attributable to
formal education, precise measurement is only possible for a few
restricted quantities such as I.Q.; education is concerned more than
virtually any other government department with the long-term
capabilities of the individual; all the products dispensed by the
educational system can probably be acquired or inculcated at other
points in society. Criteria five and six are minor difficulties by
comparison with these four. In general, as will be seen in Chapter V's
survey of presently available measures, there are disappointingly
few measures available for many areas of local government function that
will meet all these criteria.
However, by ingenuity it is possible to begin to measure for
management control purposes the output of even the most recalcitrant
of local government organizations. It is certainly not necessary to
despair of measuring the output of an organization once the focus is
on how well output meets criteria already set by the political system.
Devising Management Control Measures
The key to production measurement is designing measures which
accurately reflect the contribution of each responsibility cneter to
overall goals of the organization. These, at the management control
level, as has been stressed thus far, need not be in any one-to-one
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match with the overall goals of the organization but can be surrogate
measures. Global measures can be left for the strategic planning
debate.
There are of course restrictions on surrogate measures. As the
models of Chapter III show, if the reward system based on these
surrogates does not motivate a department to act In parallel with
overall organizational goals, then the result will be sub-optimization.
It may even be worse than uninstructed behaviour. There are a
multitude of notorious examples from socialist economies of the
farcical results of inadequate surrogate measures - ten-ton chandeliers
from factories appraised on a basis of their weight of chandeliers
produced; small-size only nails from factories appraised on number of
nails produced. (Nove, 1969) The federal government offers similar
examples. The Secretary of Defense's office issued an order to assess
contract buying efficiency on the basis of number of incentive contracts
concluded. Incentive contracts are appropriate for contracts in which
cost-overruns or underruns are likely; they are not required if
genuinely competitive bidding for contracts occurs. They will cost
the Department of Defense a premium because of the bookkeeping costs
incurred by the contractor. Since the order there has been a rapid
increase in the number of Incentive contracts in otherwise competitive
bidding procurements.
However, subject to these restrictions surrogate measures can
be derived that are suitable for assessing the efficiency of
responsibility centers in government. Firstly will be discussed the
possibility of using measures already to hand as proxies for production
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measures; secondly will be discussed problems in devising surrogates
when means to hand fail.
In the first instance production can occasionally be directly
measured. Number of children graduating to college Is an objective
measure for the high school system; number of -library books on
circulation is at least one output variable of the library system.
Normally,though,this type of measure will be only one component of
output and most often it will neglect information about the quality
of output.
Secondly, it may be possible to use judgemental measures of the
system, even where they may require less than cardinal measurement.
Such measures may often reflect 'state of the system' rather than the
output of the system in the classical sense but often they will be
essential to measuring product quality and how well the system conforms
to objectives set for it. For instance, there are relatively
objective measures of children's performance in, say, reading skills,
beset by discussion about bias against certain personality types it Is
true, but still fairly widely accepted. By contrast there are no
accepted measures of maintenance of classroom order and pupil interest.
However, a judgemental measure of such quality parameters could be
made by teachers, or supervisors involving a ranking against the
schools of their experience. The need for judgmental measures extends
to other areas - the quality of recreation programs or a library's book
collection, for example. There are, of course, several dangers in
judgmental measures, -bias caused by assessment by professionals rather
than clients of the service for example, slow innovation caused by over-
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emphasis on the characteristics of a particular technology, but such
measures do have their place.
Thirdly, it may be possible to measure production against input,
provided that input is fairly widely defined. The model of Chaptee IjIj
Indicates that this fault can be fatal. However, the measure of
Input as a proxy for production is not entirely without merit. In
the worst case it is certain that if input was zero then production is
zero too. The use of input measures is most suitable if input is
plausibly correlated with production; classroom space per pupil is a
measure of a factor input that is plausibly correlated with what
effects education can have on pupils. Again, of measures of fire
department efficiency (see Chapter V), there are several questionnaire
measures which include the question "Does the fire chief have tenure?"
an input measure (and in part a judgemental one too) but the correla-
tion with the efficiency of his administration of the department is
highly plausible. However, in general such measures should be
avoided.: the motivation to over-consume the important factor is
always present, the threat of inflexible factor combinations always
near.
Chapter V and Mushkin and Cotton (1970) are almost entirely
lists of measures of the types above, single measures of production
volume with a few measures of quality. A glance at the Mushkin and
Cotton list reveals the inadequacy of measures proposed for any
management control system with 'teeth'. For example, In the Mushkin
and Cotton list, performing arts programs are to be evaluated on the
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basis of numbers of persons. attending (p. 335, 1970) and number of
companies with national reputations performing (p. 337, 1970). The
potential misallocation from making reward dependent on these measures
is obvious; the recreation department would be motivated to engage
only nationally famous troupes, thus drawing large crowds, but
neglecting the need to give performance opportunities to local troupes.
For airports the proposed measures are: number of passengers embarking,
number of aircraft takeoffs, delay time, ground transport times -
no controls on noise or pollution or safety.
The fact is that there is a long way to go in devising production
measures suitable for management control use. The fact is further that
the PPBS effort shied away from such work.
Multivariate Product Measures
The production of public sector programs -is a many-sided
phenomenon and accordingly a measure of production would be anticipated
as being many-sided. A suitable output measure for management control
in the public sector must be of the weighted attribute, weighted
questionnaire, or multi-variate regression type. The crucial need in
management control is the development of such measures.
There are good grounds for asserting this to be the case and for
maintaining the superiority of such measures for management control
over other, single-measure criteria.
First, from the control standpoint the greater the number of
measures used to evaluate each responsibility center the less likely
It is that the cost-finding system of the responsibility will enable
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the center to set out to trick the system as in the examples given
above. This observation is subject to qual ification. There are
research results that suggest that (Charnes and Cooper, 1962) in
the presence of a multiple goal function management will concentrate
on achieving one goal to the exclusion of all other goals. It is
easy to envisage that the control agency itself could become so
swamped with information on the production measures that it would
have to tolerate a responsibility center's adopting this policy.
However, this can be avoided by the computation of some multi-
variate weighting of the output measures into a scalar, and
evaluating the responsibility centers on the basis of this scalar.
This would sidestep the Charnes and Cooper resul ts. Several
measures quoted in Chapter V are of this form: the National
Recreation Association's three schedules for urban recreation, the
National Board of Fire Underwriter's grading schedule, the various
questionnaires for police conformance with professional standards,
the ALA schedule for book collection adequacy. There are numerous
other such weighted schedules, especially in the field of health
care. These questionnaires, though, introduce new problems because
the weightings on the questionnaire may not coincide with the organi-
zation's policy objectives. Indeed the weightings may be a focus
of controversy. This is undoubtedly the reason why the National
Board of Fire Underwriters grading schedule has not received wider
acceptance for control - that it concentrates on the role of fire
departments in preventing catastrophic fires and ignores the other
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services, minor emergency and rescue, provided by the fire department.
Secondly, there are grounds for asserting this use of multi-
variate measures against the overwhelming concentration thus far in
public sector work on single-variable measures. The overwhelming
source of these measurement attempts has been cost-benefit analysis
attempts - an attempt to compare the public sector with the private
sector. A market does prevail for the private sector: such disparate
features of an automobile as its verve, power, steering, style,
smooth ride, or its suspension, repair-free record, resale value,
safety and comfort are all reduced to one measure by the market
clearing mechanism. There is no such process in the public sector;
it Is the sector of the economy where it has been decided that the
market clearing process will not prevail. The qualities of the public
sector's product line are to be valued independently.
There remains the problem of devising such weighted multi-variate
measures. There are two approaches that could be chosen. In the past
the approach to the development of mul ti-variate measures has been
almost exclusively that of attaching weights to various questions
-relating to a department's operations and Its achievements of objec-
tives. There is reason to believe though that in the future multivatiate
statistical analyses will become more important in the devising of
management control measures. Such analyses open the possibility of
separating out different effects on the objectives of the department,
connecting performance measures to social indicators. The latter
approach, statistical analysis, consists of an analysis of the output
into the various factors accounting for the variation observed. Dis-
cussion of this approach has been particularly important in the area
of education with the recent experiments with educational performance
contracting. Barro (1970) and Hanushek (1970) both discuss the
methods available for separating out the effects of education into
their teacher, school and school district components.
There are some problems in developing such models. In education
the factor effects are likely to be so small that analyzing them will
require quite sophisticated models and close attention to econometric
problems. It seems that in this case the models themselves would be
highly controversial. In other areas of government, factor effects
are probably stronger and less sophisticated models may be sufficient.
Operationally it is unfortunate that such models must he devised by
area-wide agencies with large data collecting capacities since this
restricts local initiative.
The major multi-variate measures currently available for
departmental evaluation are of the weighted questionnaire type.
Conceptually the questionnaire approach is similar to the multiple-
regression method - the weights are now determined by more or less
expert intuition. Typically, however, there are strong differences
in the material analyzed in a questionnaire. Most questionnaires
will include few measures of production; typically they only include
questions on departmental methods, with relatively few questions on
direct service. Many of the questionnaires suggested for appraisal
of school systems give no rating for pupil achievement scores. This
is probably a fundamental limitation of the questionnaire approach for
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the intuition of professionals has been insufficient to rate the
value added by various outputs and the regression models are
intended to supplement this intuition.
Both methods of devising multi-variate weighting scales face
quite serious problems of biasing the allocation of resources, even
though the purpose of using batteries of measures is to avoid bias.
Particularly in the intuitive design of questionnaires there is a
tendency to favor a particular production technology, that approved
most by professionals. Nor are statistical methods of devising
weights free from bias. Here the bias will lie in the output
measures to be explained. Most of the statistical work on
accountability measures in education has concentrated on explaining
variation in achievement test scores. The incentive for schools to
convert to crammers is clear.
More seriously, weights are often controversial. There may be
considerable controversy on the valuation of the overall output
measured. One method might be to use questionnaires with non-
exclusive questions - e.g. different types of school might receive
the same weightings on the questionnaire rather than attempting to
make a polarized scale.
A second approach, more commonly practised, might be to use
checklists - unweighted combinations of output measures and proxies -
leaving the choice of weightings to the local decision-makers.
Classed with these checklists are the various sets of standards
published by professional bodies such as the American Library
Association and state health agencies. Such checklists provide a
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structure for budgeting discussions even though a management control
system using such a checklist would not have the sources of
comparisons with other cities or even over its own history that are
available with nationally consistent measures for use as standards.
However, the model of Chapter III has shown that standards need not
necessarily be based on comparability with other occurrences.
Expected performance can be generated with the help of a checklist
and performance monitored for deviation against these 'negotiated'
standards. Admittedly, the management control process would be
weakened by reliance exclusively on such measures with no sources
of comparison but it would not be rendered impossible. It is with
such aids that a program budget could come into its own.
Probably the most rapid advance in the field of devising multi-
variate measures will come by the combination of statistical analysis
approach with that of professional questionnaire design. Professionals
have often objected to the use of questionnaires on the basis of an
'arbitrary' weighting. Here the use of techniques such as Guttmann
scaling or even simple linear regression against subjective evaluations
of programs might enable professionals more easily to make the
transition from the concrete - the programs - to the weighting system
proposed. COppenheimer, 1967).
Accordingly there is potentially a wide range of product measures
which could be developed for management control. It is maintained here
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that few agencies of local government, courts, education and
recreation possibly excluded, could not have performance measures
developed for a full appraisal of their work. Those departments
mentioned above would have to rely on less structured measures but
could still be monitored in a formal management control process.
Existing measures are indeed in most cases inadequate or partial
but the potential is great.
However, as will be seen in Chapter V at present in most
governments very little use is made of even those measures that are
available; it seems moreover that little attempt has been made to
advocate wider use of these measures.
Recent Development of Production Measures
In the light of the discussion of budgetary practices and the
Anthony classification given above, it is not surprising that most
local governments at present use in their budgeting only workload
measures and a few social indicators. Indeed many, as predicted by
the Crecine model (1968),use only input measures (i.e. decision rules
of the type 5% over last year, 3 1/2 down from last year), This
Is, of course, linked to the predominant operational control function
of present budgetary procedures. As Chapter V will show, the budget
reports of major cities reveal that this is the case in all but a
few cities. Moreover there has been relatively little Improvement over
the practices of forty years ago.
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Furthermore it is not surprising that PPBS did little to
advance the use of performance measures. PPBS was after all not
aiming to upgrade the efficiency of public programs; its primary
concern was with deriving measures of need for programs, developing
alternatives to present programs. Of the major papers on output
measures for PPBS (Subcommittee on economy in government, 1970;
Hinrichs and Taylor, 1967) only one author in discussing output
measures contemplates their use in management control (Mushkin and
Cotton, 1970, p.332-2 4 0) under a section on 'program effectiveness
as a determinant of grant awards'; otherwise most observers appear
to share the opinion of Hatry (1968, p.9 4 ).
'the criteria in the paper are intended for the purpose
of proposed program alternatives, not for evaluating
staffs or departments current operating efficiency.
in marked contrast to the attitudes of the 1930's:
"we must devise methods of measuring the deqree of....
accomplishment, in this way random instances of good
or bad administration will be replaced by systematic
observations of the efficiency of operation.' (Ridley
and Simon, 1938, p.1)
PPBS is associated with work on two major measures of government
programs: benefit-cost analysis and social indicators. It is
contended that neither type of measure is appropriate for management
control although they may have some value in strategic planning.
It is doubtful whether even this is true for benefit-cost analysis.
The benefit-cost analysis, the comparison of the imputed monetary
benefit of public expenditures and the expenditures, was very much
the model for analysis in PPBS. The major teaching text in the field
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has the title 'Program budgeting and benefit-cost analysis'
(Hinrichs and Taylor, 1.67). The quotation in Chapter II from
Greenhouse (1960) gives the flavour of this approach to PPBS.
Conceptually the cost-benefit ratio could be used in much the same way
as the profit figure (ROt) in the private sector and thus used in manage-
ment control through a profit center system but In practice this is
simply not feasible. While the output of some public programs do
represent production valued at market prices - fire protection, for
example - distributional effects are the basis for most public
programs. To attempt to usurp the role of the political valuation
process will be a thankless task. Benefit-cost analysis is certainly
not up to such a task.
Social indicators work began, like benefit-cost analyzing before
the PPBS effort (see Bauer, 1967). A social indicator is a summary
index of major social conditions. Work on social indicators began in
the early 1960's with a NASA study of its own impact on society.
Currently HEW maintains a social indicators staff, primarily working
on health care. Like benefit-cost analysis, social indicators carry
no implications for the efficiency of government programs. However,
such indices do relate to the welfare of society: Gross's definition
of a social indicator (Gross, in Bauer, 1967, p. 117) insists on the
normative role of a social indicator:
"when the indicators improve, the supposition is that,
other things being equal, welfare has improved, and
vice versa"
I.e. the indicator measures progress on the highest goals of society.
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However, as discussed above, society's highest goals are not
readily translated into measures for management control. This Is not
the view of some of the proponents of social indicators' work:
"social indicators are quantitative measures of social
conditions designed to guide choices at several levels
of decision-making..." (Sawhill, 1970, p. 473)
Precisely the opposite to the Anthony-based classification of the uses of
production measures advanced here. Crime rates may be soaring but
this is no reason to shift resources into grossly inefficient or
ineffective programs for crime prevention such as the various criminal
rehabilitation programs. For measures of efficiency and effectiveness
in government, it is necessary to look elsewhere.
In the next chapter are summarized those output measures that
do have some connection with the management control process. In
addition the chapter reviews the current degree of use of these
measures in the budgetary processes of a sample of major cities.
CHAPTER V
Output Measures for Major Local Government Departments
In this chapter are presented summaries of the major measures of
production suitable for use in management control in major city
departments.
The departments discussed are:
I. Police
i. Fire
Iii. Education
Iv. Library
v. Recreation/Parks
vi. Welfare
vii. Public Health
together with one example of a service department
vii. Finance
The section on each department is organized as follows:
a. the general mission of the department
b. measures for management control of the department
c. summary of reporting of production measures in budget
documents for major cities
The purpose of section c. is to assess current management practices
In the major cities and to evaluate the budget process's reliance on
output measures, along the lines of Schick (1971, p.56). A measure
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is judged to be used in the management control process if it is
reported in a public budget document, planning the allocation of
revenue for the annual or biennial activities of the city. Such
documents exclude a comptroller's report of past expenditures (not
because such documents are not relevant to the management control
process, but because all such documents failed to include any measures
of production resulting from expenditures) and individual department
reports (chiefly on grounds of data gaps). This selection does not
therefore include all possible management control uses of production
measures. It certainly, by excluding individual department reports,
excludes means by which department heads win approval of their
Management. However, the budget reports do at least indicate what
information is generated that could be used in management control.
The city budgetary documents used are the following:
New York 1942 1958 1968
Los Angeles 1939 1960 1966
Chicago 1939 1960 1967
Boston 1941 1958 1969
San Francisco 1942 1955 1969
Milwaukee 1945 1959 1966
Detroit 1943 -1956 1968
New Orleans 1940 1959 1970
Philadelphia 1940 1958 1967
Pittsburgh 1941 1955 1965
Fort Worth 1944 1955 1969
Cleveland 1942 1957 1969
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Cincinnati 1943 1958 1968
Seattle 1940 1958 1969
Washington, D.C. 1944 1958 1970
Minneapolis 1942 1958 1969
Miami/Dade County 1943 1958 1969
For each city, it was intended to collect budgetary documents for
the years 1941, 1958, l69, but it was not always possible to find
these years in the lists searched.
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1. Pol ice Department
a. A police department's fundamental mission is the protection of
persons and property from crime by enforcing laws. Although the
typical city police force will have other roles, particularly those of
reporting to other city departments such as welfere and the building
ahd health code divisions, law enforcement remains the primary role of
the po lice.
W9. Statistics
1. Police cost per capita
This is an input measure and does not reveal either the
effectiveness of the spendirn or the need for the spending.
2. Arrest lists
Many cities publish lists of arrests made broken down by type
of offence. This probably ranks as a workload measure for
although measuring one parameter of police work no indication
of the magnitude of the task required is given.
3. Crime rates
Although a major social indicator of the need for police protec-
tion, crime rates are an inadequate control device for police
management. Several other agencies are concerned with crime
prevention - the courts, the reformatories, as well as welfare
agencies, the schools and other social supportive agencies.
There are strong secular trends in crime rate - notably a
falling off in war time - reflecting social currents.
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"Statistics showing the voluem of crime when
unsupported by other data, do not provide a
basis for comparisons of police efficiency"
Committee on Uniform Crime Records, International
Association of Police Chiefs, Uniform Crime
Report Manual, 1930, sec. 4.4.
There is a second defect in using crime rates to measure
effectiveness. There are two classes of crime called Class I
and Class I by the FBI: Class I covers felonies, larcenies,
murders, rapes - serious crimes which will normally be brought
to the attention of the police; Class 11 covers offences such
as prostitution, illegal gambling, traffic offences, swindling,
drug trafficking - such offences will not often be brought to
the attention of the police but must be detected by them.
Therefore Class I[ crime rates are no measure of the
prevalence of such crimes - simply a measure of the work of the
police in searching out such crimes. Only for Class I crimes
is the 'crime rate' even a measure of the committing of crimes.
The problem of determining seriousness of crimes can be
approached by the Class I, Class 11 breakdown. However, one
convenient index of the seriousness of crime is the crime
rate weighted by the average sentence awarded by the courts for
that crime.
4. Property Insurance Rates
These are occasionally used as ratings of police efficiency in
property theft prevention. However, such measures being
based on experience rating are directly dependent upon crime
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rates themselves and are in turn unsuitable for management
control of the police department.
5. % Cases Cleared by Arrest
For Class I crimes this is an extremely useful performance
measure of the quality of police work. Arrests are a
unique power of the police - the quantity measured is entirely
within police responsibility. However, for Class II crimes
this measure is clearly unsuitable for it will normally be
100%.
6. % Stolen Property Recovered
This is again a useful performance measure, entirely within
police competence.
7. % Arrests Resulting in Convictions
Although not solely within the responsibility of the police,
since a conviction reflects attitudes of the courts in some
degree, the measure does reflect accuracy of police arrests
and the adequacy of police presentation of evidence.
8. Response Time to Calls for Assistance
This measure is likely to be difficult and expensive to
collect without a fully automated dispatching system. However,
it does reflect an important component of police service to
the public and could be monitored by periodic sampling.
Accordingly, for Class I crimes there is a battery of police-
responsibility measures that could be used in management control.
Besides the apprehension of criminals, however, the public expects
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the police to conform to certain other standards, of training, of
visibility and of freedom from corruption, which may have only a
slight impact on the efficacy of police In crime detection and
apprehension. In this matter it seems that judgemental factors cannot
be avoided in making an assessment of the police.
There have been several attempts to systematize these judge-
mental factors. There are three principal measurement scales - only
one of which has any currency at present. All three were developed
in the 1930 's and '40's. All three are questionnaires of police
department practices: none include any of the above quoted output
measures.
Historically the first questionnaire developed was by Spencer
D. Parratt (1935). The questionnaire includes 1300 questions on
police practice, covering the work of every department represented in a
metropolitan police force. Each of the questions is weighted; the
overall questionnaire forms a scalar, the weightings on the question-
naire were according to the author derived in discussions with three
of four noted police experts. The questions themselves are generally
worked out as objectively as possible - there are only three or four
questions of the type "is the police chief's appointment free of
politics?", and Parratt advocated the questionnaire as suitable for
self-administration or for fairly inexpert observers.
In 1940 the FBI published an internal document, partly based on
the Parratt scale, entitled "Rating scale for police force effectiveness".
Although never widely published, the scale has had some currency, and
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the FBI in 1960 published an updated edition and claims to process
several requests from cities for copies of the questionnaire each
year. However, the FBI itself does not publish ratings of forces.
In 1950, Leonard, a police service consultant, likewise
published a rating scale for police forces in an addendum to the book,
'Police Organization and Management'. It is not specified whether
the questionnaire has ever been used by police forces. In fact, the
scale is no more than a checklist and no attempt is made to give any
overall ratings. The questions involved are often subjective -
e.g. Q. A17 "are police operations PLANNED?" (actual emphasis) or
Q. Bb2 "Is the department 'traffic-oriented'?".
All these questionnaires are essentially attempts to evaluate
police forces against professional standards of force effectiveness.
As such they may not reflect public concepts of police effectiveness
and are probably over-advocative of particular methods and procedures.
None of the questionnaires are suitable for overall evaluation since
none include any of the production measures given for police forces.
Conformity with professional standards is in order provided that the
cases cleared by assignment of guilt figures and cases cleared by
arrest figures are also in line with expectations. However, subject
to this proviso, either the FBI scale or the Parratt scale would be
excellent summaries for laymen of the standards of a police force.
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c. Measures Used in Budget Reports of 17 Large Cit es
1940's late '50's late '60's
Measures
Cost per cap. 15 16 14
Arrest list 17 15 9
Crime rates 13 11 14
% Cases/arrest 8 7 4
% Value recovered 10 5 5
% Autos recovered 4 5 5
% Arrests/conviction 2 0 1
Rating scale 0 0 0
Insurance rate/theft 2 0 4
in all cases not reported by police but In other
section of report.
Clearly few cities publish performance statistics for the police
departments. Inthis respect police departments compare unfavorably
with fire departments where measurement problems are of only slightly
less difficulty. On the whole this probably reflects the autonomy
of most city police departments vis a vis central authority.
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ii. Fire Department
a. The mission of the fire department is probably more clearly
defined than any other city department, with the exception of perhaps
the police and the library system. Fire protection is almost the
entire mission of the fire department; rescue from non-fire dangerous
situations is the only exception. Fire protection Itself can be
broken down into measurable sub-objectives. "The four objectives of
fire protection are: to prevent fires from starting, to prevent loss
of life and property when a fire starts, to confine a fire to the
place where it started, and to put out the fire." (International City
Managers Association, l67, p.1)
However, devising responsibility measures for these missions and
sub-missions is complicated by the fire department's sharing the task
of fire protection with other city departments and by the dependence
of fire risk upon environmental influences. Risk of fire depends
upon the building conditions in a city, upon the climate of the city,
upon sodial conditions; upon the prevalence of over-insurance, upon
the efficiency of the building department's inspectors. Effectiveness
in fighting fires depends not only upon the fire department's staff
and equipment but also upon the adequacy of the water supply and even
upon congestion of traffic. As with other departments of local
government, it is necessary to separate out these extraneous effects
from those effects that are within the responsibility of the fire
department. However, in distinction from other departments, fire
departments do have the advantage of a well-defined mission and service
provided.
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b. Statistics
Before proceding further it is useful to derive one measure of
risk in fire protection, value of burnable property. This is
usually calculated as the total assessed value of the city, less
assessed value of land, the result multiplied by a price adjustor
to bring assessments to fair market value. The assessment records
of almost all cities are sufficient to support this measure.
1. Cost per capita/per S1000 valuation/per t1000 burnable property
These are input measures, unlikely to be correlated with
efficiency or effectiveness of the fire department. Studies
(e.g. Ridley and Simon, 1938) show no correlation between
spending variables and fire losses.
2. Number of fires recorded/by type/by value of loss
These are at least in part workload measures, although in part
they are measures of need for fire prevention. Number of
fires reflects insurance practices, incendiarism, business
iconditions, and is not necessarily related closely to fire
department practices, although there is a useful cross-
checking relationship with the work of fire prevention
sections.
The data is useful more for planning, as in planning
disposition of men and equipment and fire prevention work,
than for control.
3. Fire loss total/% of burnable property
This Is the most obvious measure for assessment of a fire
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department. The statistic is reported for most cities over
10,000 population by insurance rating bureaus-and can
accordingly be readily used for inter-city comparisons.
However, the same strictures apply to this measure as
to 2.: the fire loss of a city is subject to fluctuations
resulting from exogenous factors outside the control of the
fire department. Again the measure will be useful for
planning and checking department policy rather than in
control of the department. Conclusions based on this measure
are more useful in making comparisons over time for one depart-
ment, rather than making conclusions about effectiveness of
different departments.
4. Loss per fire
This measure has been proposed (Ridley, C.E. and Simon, H.A.,
1938) as a measure of fire fighting effectiveness superior
to 2. or 3. It is argued that although exogenous factors
affect strongly the likelihood of a fire's startinq, their
effect on fire spread is much weaker. As a result, loss per
fire should be largely under the control of the fire department.
However, again this measure is probably not independent of
exogenous conditions: mercantile fires commonly cost more than
do residential fires - change in land use proportions will
therefore tend to change the expected loss per fire.
5. [njury/Death'by fire statistics
These statistics face the same problems in control as do
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loss statistics with the added reservation that injury/death
statistics are subject to more random fluct tation since the
number of deaths/injuries is smaller than the number of
fires resulting in loss.
6. Response time to alerts
This statistics has been focused upon by the several
operational research applications to fire department dispatch-
ing problems. While response time is clearly an important
component of fire department fire fighting effectiveness, it
in turn ignores many other aspects of fire department
operations. Defining the measure itself is more awkward than
at first appears in so far as it is necessary to define what
constitutes a response - a motor-cycle combination or three
ladder trucks? Different cities respond with different
equipment and staff to the same type of alarm. There has been
no study of the variation of fire loss with response time or
response weight.
7. National Board of Fire Underwriter's Grading Schedule
First published in 1904, the NBFU grading schedule is a
periodically revised scale used by insurance rating bureaus to
assess the risk of major fire losses in a city. The schedule,
part of which is appended in diagram, 11.1, is widely used by
the insurance agencies; most cities are assessed at least
once In ten years and more if major land use changes are
occurring. The schedule is less widely used for self-appraisal
by fire departments, but nevertheless the connection between
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a high rating on the scale and a lower insurance cost is
widely appreciated in fire departments. F, i-s a measure of
the reliability of loss statistics that insurance companies
prefer to avoid experience rating of cities but rely upon
the grading schedule.
The schedule includes approximately 110 questions on
major aspects of a city's fire prevention capabilities and
Its fire risk. The questions included are grouped by major
sections on the operations of the fire department, on the
city's water supply, on the building code; on the city plan
and building conditions, on the alarm system, and on various
exceptional environmental factors in the city. Of the total
rating, 34% is on water supply characteristics, 30M is on
fire department, 11? is on fire alarm and communications
systems, 7% concerns prevention work, 4% is on building
department effectiveness, and 14% is on 'structural condi-
tions': in total 48% of the rating is under the typical fire
department's responsibility. Rating of the fire department
includes questions on: staffing, qualifications and experi-
ence; on equipment, especially pumping equipment; on communi-
cation systems, on response methods; on the alarm system,
type of boxes and their distribution.
The questions included are intended for use by fire
i-nsurance rating engineers rather than laymen. However, there
Is no reason why the questionnaire could not be administered
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by experienced fire department staff or that its results
could not be comprehensible to laymen. As such the question-
naire Is a model for other departments of government. Using
it, It should be possible to impute value to the work of
different responsibility units; comparisons can be made between
cities (the Municipal Yearbook publishes biennial ratings
summaries); and each city can use the questionnaire to keep up
with professional practices.
However, there are certain drawbacks to using the grading
schedule for control and assessment of a fire department. The
questionnaire is intended for assessing protection against
major conflagration loss, since the large payout resulting
from conflagration is the payout that is likely to hankrupt
an insurance firm. However, from the point of view of the
metropolitan area, this risk may be less serious - less serious
than bankruptcy of an insurance firm would warrant - and the
fire department's mission may include more prominently the
control and response to minor fires and aiding in traffic
accidents and other rescue emergencies. The questionnaire
gives relatively low rating to aspects of fire protection that
would be necessary for such missions - rescue apparatus,
training in lifesaving, prevention against residential fire
hazard rather than commercial fire hazard. As such, over-
reliance on the grading schedule's result might lead to
neglect of these functions.
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Secondly, the questionnaire, like most such schedules
that could be used for assessing departments, emphasizes a
particular technology of service. This is most evident
in the grading schedule in the section rating response to
fire; the schedule lays down in great detail the minimum
weight of response required, on an appropriate scale for a
major oil refinery blaze. However, such a response might be
awkwardly costly for a fire department facing numerous false
alarms - to respond to every alarm with the minimum weight
necessary for a high grading is unlikely to be cost-effective.
The questionnaire therefore at present suffers from the common
defect involved in assessing departments on their technology
rather than their output - constraints on policy innovations.
Therefore the use of the grading schedule for control
and budgeting should be undertaken with an eye to the mis-
allocations likely to result. However, the questionnaire
idoes remain extremely useful as a tool of benefit-cost
analysis: cost of each fire department service is measured
and can be compared to the benefits of reduced insurance
premiums that will accrue.
8. Prevention Measures
Most fire departments include a section concerned with fire
prevention rather than fire-fighting. Such a section
typically has responsibility for building inspections, for
approving building plans, and conducting education programs.
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The problems of assessing inspection divisions such as fire
code enforcement sections is one that will turn up frequently
In other departments of local government. Controlling the
output of such sections is particularly awkward in that
there is no obvious standard of quality of an inspection:
the same resources can be employed in numerous skimped
Inspections or relatively few thorough inspections, picking
up and clearing up all violations. Fortunately it is possible
to cross-check the work of the department against the records
of fires by type of violation causing the fire.
The inspection bureau should as a minimum collect
statistics on
a. number of inspections performed
b. number of violations detected
c. number of violations cleared up
These statistics will be useful for at least for planning
.purposes. For checking the quality of work of the prevention
division, these measures should be compared against 2. given
above with a record of violations used in detecting fires.
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c. Measures Used in Budget Reports of 17 Large Cities
fires by type
value
cause
alarm type
fire loss total
% burnable
loss per fire
response time
rating
insurance premiums
inspection no.
no. violations
1940's
11
2
10
10
6
7
6
3
11
late '50's
17
4
12
17
13
-
5
14
late '60's
17
6
1
17
17
7
12
6
5
15
2
The table shows that most fire departments do give a fairly full
accounting in the budget of the output measures suggested, although
in some cases it seems that the purpose of the full accounting is to
overwhelm budgeteers with detail. Again, however, there are
relatively few cities that quote the higher level output measures -
fire loss % burnable grading schedule rating - in budgeting. However,
as will become clear in other departments,the fire department's
reporting is generally far superior to that of other departments.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
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iii. Education Department
a. Most cities spend 30% to 70% of their revenues on the provision
of public schooling. Gains in efficiency in education would therefore
have major revenue implications for cities.
Education poses the problem of devising production measures in
particularly acute form. Firstly, there is little agreement on what
constitute the objectives of education and disagreement is always
likely to prevail. The model of the product - the ideal pupil -
ranges from the most extreme authoritarian to the most permissive
models; the type of skills to be communicated is the subject of only
a vague consensus; the relationship of teaching methods to type of
pupil encouraged is only partly known. There is only a vague
consensus therefore on objectives or production function. Secondly,
the educational process is strongly affected by agencies outside the
school system. The consensus is that approximately 80% of academic
achievement depends on socio-economic factors (Firman, 1966; Kiesling,
1971; 'Coleman Report', 1966). Separating out these effects is a
major difficulty in the way of management control design. Work on
formal methods to separate out these effects as opposed to using
managerial intuition to estimate variances has only recently begun
(Kiesling, 1971).
There is moreover strong professionalism in education posing
obstacles in the way of outside audit of education. Resistance to
use of production measures in evaluation and appraisal of managers is
strong. Even though professionals will be interested in achievement
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tests, rarely will they agree to be evaluated personally on these
measures.
However, opposed to all these factors there has been a continuing
interest in public education measurement. Education has always been
a focus of citizen interest and citizens have usually been powerfully
grouped enough to override professional objections. The most
startling examples of this have come in the late '60's with the
performance contracting movement (Lessinger, 1971) - school systems
contracting with private firms to provide education, particularly to
backward pupils, contracts involving reward systems of the type given
in the model of Chapter III, and production measures of the much-
criticized standard achievement test type.
From the performance contracting era, back to the surveys of
school systems organized in the 1920's and 1930's (Caswell, 1929;
Mort, 1930; Ridley and Simon, 1M38, p. 4 2- 4 3)., there have been continual
attempts at implementing output monitoring systems, with management
appraisal and control in mind. Title I of the 1965 Education Act
specifically requires evaluation of the impact of its monies on pupil
achievement in order to evaluate the programs: with increasing shares
of revenues of school districts coming from the Federal qovernment
it may well be that increasingly output will be monitored as a prerequi-
site for Federal funding. Such has been the amount of research going
into evaluation that it does seem that Carpenter and Rapp's (1969)
comment on the introduction of management control measures is valid.
"We believe that the crux of the problem is not so much
to develop new measures but more to assemble information
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checks in scattered locations throughout the system in
such a way that best use may be made of it." (1969, p.3)
More than In any other area of government operations in manage-
ment control of education it is clear that a battery of measures
must be used. While attempts to (Becker, l64) assess the value of
Investment in education through the human capital approach, i.e.
measuring discounted salary flows expected for a particular graduate
from the school system, do have some application, such measures are
neither timely enough nor sufficiently uncontroversial for use in
management control except possibly as a minor check on quality of
output.
b. Statistics
1. Primitive statistics. These comprise workload measures appro-
priate to education. Such measures are relatively easy to
collect and to audit; however, they rarely control for
factors outside the competence of the schools.
a. numbers of pupils in school system
b. curriculum hours per subject instruction
c. school days/year
d. number of graduates admitted to college
e. employment/salaries received by graduates
f. drop-out rates; juvenile delinquency rates
2. Academic achievement tests.
In contrast to the unrigorous measures of pupil skills and
Intelligence included in the above measures, quite sophisticated
tests of achievement and mental ability have been devised. (Burros,
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1960). In addition there are a wide range of soclometric
tests for measuring attitudes.
a. grades and grade point averages - relative measures like
other achievement tests.
b. achievement tests - a list is given in Burros (1960). Several of
these tests are widely used and the distribution of
results is published. Test score norms are available for
some tests for socio-economic classes.
c. attitude tests
The degree of professional acceptance of these tests varies
widely. Few of the attitude tests would be acceptable; some
of the achievement tests would not be accepted either.
However, tests such as the SAT, or the Iowa Reading test, or
the Stanford Reading Test, or the Lorge-Thorndike intelligence
tests, are widely accepted as measuring achievement in the
areas tested. At the elementary levels it seems that such
tests would be accepted as the quality measures. Such tests
have been standard for the performance contracts of the last
four years. At high school level and even in the normal
elementary school rewards based on such tests would cause
misallocation of resources to concentrate on training pupils
to pass these tests.
3. Appraisal Forms
As ciscussed above, in Chapter IV, appraisal forms offer a
possibility for control of avoiding these distortions - a
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carefully balanced questionnaire of sufficient complexity
discourages managers from over-concentration on particular
production lines. Education has produced a great diversity
of such appraisal forms (Mort, 1930; Kentucky - Bureau of
School Service, 1964; National Education Association, 1966;
National Study of School Evaluation, 1970).
The appraisal forms vary greatly in their content and measures
used. They demonstrate that the questionnaire must be very
carefully checked to avoid bias. Two of the questionnaires in
particular are strongly biased in favor of a particular pro-
duction technology or a type of product. The National
Education Association appraisal form on examination proves to
be heavily in favor of particular staffing patterns, providing
teachers with high salaries, secure tenure, ample classroom
space and few pupils. The Mort appraisal form likewise
stresses equipment and curriculum content. It is doubtful if
either questionnaire would be acceptable to professionals or
to school boards. The Kentucky Bureau of School Service and
the National Study of School Evaluation questionnaires are
much less evidently biased. Both in addition to including
questions on staffing standards and school plant give heavy
weighting to achievement tests. The National Study of School
Evaluation allows for socio-economic differences in the pupils,
and includes other production measures such as extra-curricular
participation, drop-out rates, jobs obtained and numbers
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performing at or above grade point level. Both of these,
it seems, could be used in an evaluation scheme. The Kentucky
Bureau of School Service in fact has a contract with the state
to carry out a performance audit, using the questionnaire and
its developments.
4. Looser Evaluation Methods
Disagreement over the objectives of education runs through
the weighted appraisal form of output measure. Conceptually,
as discussed in Chapter IV, the appraisal form could be
constructed of the non-exclusive type to allow a school district
to emphasize very different outputs from another school
district but still to rank highly.
However, looser appraisal methods have been preferred.
The University of New York (196P) handbook is oriented towards
these looser appraisal methods, being a list of different
possible questionnaires and tests ranging in type from child's
readiness to attend school to standardized achievement tests
and staffing tests. Choice of tests and their relative
weighting is left to the school. A major project is being under-
taken by the Center for the Study of Evaluation (Hoepfer, Nelkin,
et al., 1971) in developing a do-it-yourself educational self-
evaluation guide aimed at helping school principals rather
than district superintendents. The materials of the guide
cover "how the principal can select the information he needs
regarding student performance that will reflect the views of
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parents, teachers, school board members", "how the principal
can select the tests that will give him the kinds of informa-
tion he needs... .how the principal can interpret the test
data in light of his school's particular.and unique character-
istics... .how the principal can decide where to place his
resources to get the greatest improvement in his school...."
(Center for Study of Evaluation, p.8, 1971)
5. Statistical Models for Accountability
Much interest has been focused in the past decade on the
possibility of using statistical models to explain variation
in pupil performance. (Firman, 1966; 'Coleman Report', l96;
Kiesling, 1971; Barro, 1970, Hanushek, 1970). The potential
usefulness of such models in management control has been most
forcefully stated by Hanushek, 1970:
"the development of a production function will lead
to....the separation of teacher effects on perform-
ance, school effects on performance and district
effects on performance...." (p.13)
As a method of explaining variances, the models represent a
considerable advance over previous intuitive methods. The
models have led to the formation of the consensus that school
performance is dominated by outside influences. However, the
problem of actual measures of performance remains - few pro-
fessionals will agree to be evaluated solely on the standard
achievement tests drop-out rates and continuing education
rates used in the most sophisticated accountability models yet
devised.
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The diversity of measures available is such that no school system need
shrink from building its management control system around production
measures presently available. The model of Chapter III suggests that
a system can still perform efficiently aven where output standards
are derived internally and changed periodically - comparability
between systems is not essential.
c. Statistics Reported In Budget Reports of 17 Cities
Measures '40's '50's '60's
Cost per pupil 4 8 8
Number of pupils 13 16 16
Number of hours
of instruction 1 - 7
Number of graduates 2 2 4
Teachers/class - 2 -
These statistics were those which were discovered most frequently in the
budget reports and were adjudged to have workload use or possible
implications for quality. Clearly, in most cities the budget process
makes formal use of only the lowest level output measures.
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iv. Library
a. Libraries are a part of the education, cultura. and recreational
missions of a government. At the management control level the
missions of the library itself are those of
a. circulating books
b. maintaining a reference collection
c. acting as an information center
with subsidiary missions in, e.g. children's library, films/music,
presenting special exhibitions.
The state of management control reporting is probably more
promising in libraries than in virtually any other city department.
Partly this reflects the production-line operations that are the bulk
of library work, partly it reflects the strength of professionalism
in libraries. In the library field, there are several major published
assessments of libraries, notably the Enoch Pratt Free Library Bulletin's
assessments annually of 20 or so major city libraries which cover
library operations in very full detail. The American Library
Association (ALA) also publishes a set of statistics annually for over
500 library systems. These comparisons and the standards published
by the ALA and various state and library research agencies form a full
basis for management control reporting in city libraries. However,
typically the management control process as presented In budget
documents has lagged behind in the use of these appraisal tools.
b. Statistics
1. Expenditures per capita
While commonly quoted in budget documents, this is unrelated
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to performance.
2. Number of books in circulation
This is the most commonly quoted library output measure.
However, its use in management control is restricted because
a. It is strongly affected (like other library use
statistics) by socio-economic trends in the area served
b. It ignores 'quality' of circulation
3. Number of books in stock
This is also a commonly quoted output measure.
4. Number of registered borrowers
On ALA standards this represents the number of persons
registered for borrowing in the last 3 years. The measure
suffers from the defects of lagging behind actual usage and of
ignoring the ancillary service - information, reference,
provided by the library
5. Number of users
This measure involves an attempt to avoid the restrictions of
the number of registered borrowers measure. Some libraries have
a turnstile entry system that measures all entrants to the
library, i.e. not only borrowers but also browsers, persons
using the reference section, newspaper readers and by an extra
collection system, telephone enquirers. These figures are
generally unlikely to be reliable or sufficiently sound on
audit to provide for inter-library comparisons although they
may be useful for trends in library use estimating.
6. Response time to service .
This covers a blanket of measures of response to service -
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such as availability of book on search, time required to
search;. number of successful answers in reference/information
section. Such measures will usually require an expensive
collection system and will not be free from tampering or
feedback effects on their incorporation in a management
control system. However, the measures could be collected on
a sampling basis by a periodic inspection of the library's
service, without undue loss of reliability or expense.
7. Quality of Stock Measures
All the above measures neglect the issue of the educational
quality of the materials provided by the library. This is a
continuing source of debate in the library profession for it
Is generally necessary for a library to choose between
popularity and supplying much fiction use and lower popularity and
more non-fiction. In other words, libraries are a merit good.
There Is a trade-off between popularity and educative value
not only in book circulation but also in sections such as film
and music.
a. Ratio of Fiction/Non-Fiction in Circulation
Again tends to be affected by socio-economic factors
b. Comparisons of Book Stock with ALA Checklists
ALA produces lists of recommended books (samples) for various
classes of library services. In 1966 a similar list was issued
for non-book materials.
8. Multi-variate Measures of Library Performance
All the above quantitative measures seem to be deficient in
a. measuring non-book, non-circulation activities of a
library
b. including factors which are outside the libraries'
competence
If used for control in the strong fashion of Chapter III, it
is likely that such measures would produce serious biases in
resource allocation.
However, in the field of librarianship the strong profes-
sionalism has meant that many tables of standards have been
published. In particular the ALA has published standards of
general library service approximately decenially for the past
forty years: 1943 - Standards of Postwar Library Service;
1956 - Standards of Public Library Service; 1966- Revised
Standards for Public Libraries. The standards arenot in the form
of multi-variate scalar criteria and no attempt is made by
the ALA to weight the achievements of different criteria. The
standards include recommendations on: staffing patterns and
training; the major product measures given above; square
footage per 1000 population; circulation rates; % circulation
per 1000 population served; facilities provided; stocks
provided. In this respect of measuring production the checklist
is much more adventurous than similar standards in other areas.
The checklist, however, does include 'standards' for expenditure
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per capita of population served. The 166 standards are
in many respects less useful than the 1956 standards in that
they do not adjust the standards for different sizes of
population served.
Wheeler in his 1971 article (Library Journal, 1971,
p.4 55) gives a fairly clear discussion of the use of these
measures in budgeting. It seems that the ALA standards are
thought of as standards to which every library should conform.
Wheeler complains that libraries which are over standard will
suffer in budgeting; however, he is happy to use the cost per
capita standard to argue for larger library budgets.
Such a use of the checklist is unfortunate - it overlooks
the possibility of using the checklist as a weighted output vector,
the weights being provided by local policy. However, it is
possible that the situation implied in the Wheeler article may
change as more and more of the checklist ratings are published
in professional journals.
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c. Statistics Reported in Budget Reports of 17 Major Cities
earl" late
Measure
1. Number volumes in stock
2. Number borrowers registered
3. Number of borrowers as % of population
served
4. Cost per volume circulated
5. Number of square feet per capita in
library
6. Fiction/non-fiction ratio in circulation
7. ALA book stock checklist
8. Number of calls on reference service
9. Non-book materials - stock size, number
of borrowers
10. Number of ALA standards met; number
exceeded; number not met
'40's-
17 17
13 17
2
2
6
5
2
10
4
late
'60's
17
.17
8
11
1
15
8
It seems on the basis of this table that libraries do conform to
quite good reporting standards by comparison with other city departments
and that in contradistinction to other city departments the standard of
reporting has been increasing. It was noticeable in the budget reports
that even in those cities where it was clear that the budget process
was exceptionally conservative library departments still continued to
report quite fully and even to use these statistics in arguing for the
budget rather than present arguments by 'Intended use'.
1I
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v. Recreation Department
a. The recreation department of a city has functions ranging over a
variety of individual programs from the provision of open space,
playgrounds and swimming pools to the provision of facilities and
leadership for drama groups, concerts, and play groups. The recrea-
tion department's activities compete with the activities of private
entrepreneurs, dance halls, cinemas, amusement parks and racing stadiums.
Consumption of recreation is strongly dependent upon the socio-economic
class of the consumer.
The mission of the recreation department is to provide recreational
facilities as a merit good, to subsidize the consumption of merit
recreation over its private market level. Efficiency and effectiveness
in this mission can be construed as providing this merit recreat ion at
the lowest subsidy cost per consumer.
While assessment of recreational consumption is quite easy,
control on the quality of recreation consumer and its numerous side-
effects, as with, say, open-space provision is likely to be so weakly
developed that only the most informal management control model, based
around a program budget, as discussed in Chapter III, is likely to
succeed.
b. Statistics
1. Benefits at market price
Several attempts have been made to assess the benefits of
recreational provision in terms of yield at market price. It
seems doubtful whether such comparisons are valid for market
prices ignore the considerable spillover effects from
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recreational programs.
2. Juvenile delinquency statistics
A major argument used to support provision of recreational
facilities is the supposed effect of recreational provision
In reducing juvenile delinquency (Ridley and Simon, 1938, p.21).
However, no connection has satisfactorily been demonstrated.
3. Attendance statistics
The basic consumption figures for several major recreation
programs is the visit and its duration. The visit has two
parameters: the size of the clientele, i.e. how many
different people patronize the program, and the intensity of
use, how many visits are recorded. For programs where entrance
is controlled the latter statistic alone can be collected.
For registration programs such as drama programs, both sets of
statistics can be collected.
Public open spaces, playgrounds and gardens pose a much
more acute problem in data collection, for here access is
not controlled. The National Recreation Association (166)
has developed sampling techniques to estimate attendance at
summer playgrounds from peak attendance counts. Such statis-
tics are, however, likely to be contested strongly in any
management control use.
4. Quality measurement
Engaged in the production of merit goods, it cannot be assumed
by the recreation department that attendance at its facilities
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Is the sole measure of success. If this were assumed,
then the recreation department would be a major producer
of amusement arcades, sporting events and rock concerts.
Assessment of quality of recreational provision represents
a quite difficult matter for tastes in recreational consump-
tion vary quite considerably between people and between
decision-makers in different cities.
a. Schedule for Appraisal of City Recreation
This was an appraisal form published by the National
Recreation Association in 1940. It was of the multi-variate
weighted questionnaire form with approximately 500 questions
relating to each major program in a city - park space, facili-
ties and staffina for non-open space activities.
Demand for the questionnaire was reportedly rather
disappointing and the questionnaire was generally used as a
checklist for offering new ideas for departments. The form
was' discontinued and has not been maintained.
b. Range of Activities Available (proposed by Mushkin and
Cotton, 1970, p. 337). This measure neglects the types of
activities provided.
The conclusion must be that even more than education there will
be little chance in recreational programs of devising absolute measures
of output or of developing data that are susceptible to audit for the
full range of departmental programs.
However, as in education, using a form of the National Recreation
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Association type in conjunction with a program
provide a skeletal management control program.
the work to develop and implement such a system
budget will still
In almost all cases
remains to be done.
c. Statistics Reported in Budget Reports of 17 Major Cities
Measure
1. Number of patrons
2. Number of visits
Early '40's Late '50's Late '60's
3
34
5
4
On the basis of the limited inquiry and admitted weak state of
present conceptual development of output measures, it seems difficult
to critidize these statistics. Typically, however, the budget reports
were bald statements of intended use with minimal indication of
programs to be supported.
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vi. Welfare Department
a. The welfare department of most cities is dominated by a patchwork
of responsibilities for welfare work. On the- supply of welfare services
side there are many different types of programs, many different agencies,
public, private and volunteer-private; on the financing side, income
comes not only from the city but also from state, federal and private
sources. Typically the welfare department will be quite closely linked
to these other agencies.
The areas of service for the welfare agency usually includes
1. family care and counselling
2. care of children
3. probationary work
4. legal aid/medical assistance
5. psychiatric/home help work
In addition programs are provided in various types of institutional
care. Here the programs qiven above will be discussed. Usually such
services are linked by being organized on a case work basis with a case
covering the provision of possibly all of these services.
In general the management control process for the welfare agency
is not too difficult to organize. However, there are problems in
auditing production measures.
b. Statistics
1. Number of cases - total for agency
2. Cases per worker
These two statistics are the fundamental volume statistics for
8q
casework. The second has implications for the efficiency
of deployment of workers.
However, both statistics pose audit problems, stemming
from the definition of a case. Typically, a social worker
after starting work with an individual will come to offer
services to persons in the individual's family or household.
Often there will be a great deal of complexity in separating
out when a particular individual can be said to be receiving
a service, especially in the absence of definitions of services.
The professional definition of a case (Polansky, 1960) is "a
family or person for which the organization keeps separate
record". Obviously such a definition could not be used in
management control: the unit depends upon the definition given
by management. For an effective management control system,
the definition of a case should be agreed upon beforehand
either on an individual, a household or a family basis. Here
a household basis is proposed, but no national standard has
been agreed upon. In the absence of agreement, case figures
are unlikely to be comparable across agencies, either between
agencies or over time.
3. Costs per case
Although an efficiency statistic superior to cases per worker,
since cases do require resources such as travel or financial
aid other than staff time, no agency is at present likely to
have a sufficiently reliable cost accounting system to maintain
comparability.
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4. Types of service given
Caseload statistics, while useful volume measures, still pose
problems in that different types of service provided have
different values and require differing amounts of resources.
A management control system based solely on caseload output
measures would probably bring about misallocation of resources
between services. Accordingly, some measure is required of
the usefulness of the services given.
Here a multi-variate measure of some type is required.
Ideally this would be a weighted questionnaire, weights
proportional to the relative value of the services conferred;
however, no such questionnaire has been developed. Checklists
of services have been developed though - particularly Ridley
and Simon (1938, p.38) mention a National Velfare Association
checklist of 56 services. While the social work profession may
not be able to agree upon the relative values of different
services, it seems that agreement may be reached on what
constitutes a service. For management control such a checklist
could, aggregated into major services, provide a summary of
departmental operations.
5. Percentage of staff time spent per case
-Rather than enter the awkward ground of identifying and auditing
service-given reports, it might be possible to leave service mix
to the discretion of the professional, simply accepting
efficiency as maximizing the total service to the individual.
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Measuring total time spent on the individual case - i.e.
excluding travel time, time in conferences - per professional
might be such a statistic. The problems of collecting and
auditing such time statistics are formidable. Although such
statistics of time allocation have been collected in a social
work agency (Mcleod, 1972) the data was collected in a non-
threatening system with no incentives to falsify statistics,
since the data was to be used not primarily for internal
efficiency but for service pricing.
6. Agency impact measures
The value of services provided (4. above) rests in part upon the
improvements produced in the recipients of service. Several
social work agencies have at times conducted work to determine
the nature of these improvements, if any (see Wolins, 196r)).
However, as in many other departments separation of these
effects is so complex as to be unreliable even with the large
research projects discussed by Wolins. At best such projects
are likely to demonstrate to professionals the disutility
or exceptional success of a particular service. In many
services, provision of service is either compulsory - probation,
for example - or carried for maintenance of individuals with
no likelihood of long term amelioration.
Accordingly, for value of services it is probably best to
rely upon professional judgements as to services that should
be provided and to rely upon professional judgments to maintain
the quality of services provided.
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Conceptually, it is not difficult to develop measures for manage-
ment control systems in social work; however, the fundamental problem
lies in auditing these measures. Professional case relationships make
any close audit of performance difficult. However, as in most profes-
sions, a management control system could use measures of tye type
given it and rely on peer review to monitor the measures of output.
c. Statistics Published in Budget Reports of 17 Major Cities
Measure Early '40's Late '50's Late '60's
Number of cases 2 5 4
Cases per worker - 3 -
Cost per case 3 4
Services given - -
Even in the few budget reports that did quote these statistics, in all
cases the statistics,where discussed,were used as statistics of need
to justify expansion of service.
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viI Public Health
a. Cities commonly provide a variety of health maintenance and
disease prevention programs ranging over city hospital systems, home
help programs, dental clinics, immunization programs and drug control
clinics. Usually these programs are grouped under a Public Health
department. Typically control over the individual programs by the
Public Health department is quite weak, and the programs are for
budgetary purposes autonomous. At the management control level, each
program requires a separate set of output measures. Rather than discuss
such measures for every program a fairly typical program is chosen and
the necessary management control measures discussed.
Public health work is of considerable historical interest for the
development of performance measures for from 1920 to 1955 public health
work was an area with a very generally accepted national appraisal
method which could serve as an appraisal model for other areas of
government.
b. Statistics
1. Mortality indices/ mobidity indices
While these are extremely sensitive indicators of the state of
general health, they are not suitable measures for management
control of public health departments. Like education systems,
public health departments have only weak effects on the
phenomena that they seek to affect. No attempts have been made
to separate out these effects, but they do seem to be weak. In
the short-run especially, health depends upon socio-economic
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trends and is affected by epidemic cycles, while in the long
run trends in income, public cleanliness and the private
consumption of medical care are all reflected in health care
statistics.
A second defect of these statistics is that reporting
is often inadequate. This is generally not true for mortality
and natality statistics but it is probably the case for infant
mortality statistics and especially true for morbidity where
even the rudiments of collection of data are often absent.
One approach to correcting this has been the use of an
adjusted mortality index, including deaths from only those
diseases on which public health work is likely to have an
impact. Such an index and its use is discussed by Ridley and
Simon (1938, p. 28).
2. Typical Program Statistics
The individual public health project is typically highly
mission-oriented, often directed against a particular illness or
to help a particular target population. Objectives are
accordingly well-defined. The followinq statistics would be
sufficient for the management control of a typical disease
screening and treatment program:
a. number of cases screened
b. number of cases detected
c. number of cases treated
d. number of successful treatments
e. number of repeaters - not necessarily with implications for
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the success of the program as a health care program.
With some adjustments these statistics could be collected for
such programs as venereal disease control programs, immuniza-
tion programs, alcoholic and drug control programs. With some
checks on quality, the program could be extended to health
Inspection programs.
Multi-variate Measures
3. Appraisal Form for City Health Work
From 1920 to 1955 the American Public' Health Association
supported an appraisal form for city health work. The form passed
through six editions before it was discontinued in 1955: the
discontinuation seemed more the result of professional reluctance
to undergo appraisal than any internal defect of the appraisal
form. (Vaughan, J.F., 1972; Ridley and Simon, lq38).
The form was a weighted questionnaire. it included ques-
tions on the major outputs of public health departments:
inspections performed, hospital days provided, counselling
services maintained. Quality checks on the questionnaire were
fairly limited althouqh types of tests applied and even mortality
rates for the city were included. However, in actual practice
the questionnaire was used in survey work by APHA staff who
exercised their judgement in considering quality. The form
had considerable circulation, and the APHA maintained a consult-
ing service, using the form for over 500 surveys. Ratings of
major cities were published periodically. A study quoted by
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Ridley (1927) showed a high correlation between these
ratings and a mortality index. In short the questionnaire
was one of the best validated questionnaires developed to
date for measuring the absolute level of performance of a
city department.
c. Statistics Used in Budget Reports of 17 Major Cities
Measures
1. Death rates
2. Infant mortality rates
3. Number of cases
*4. Number successes
*for any single program
Early '40's
11
4
2
Late '50's
6
7
Late '60's
2
5
5
5
3
2
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Service Departments
Most organizations will have some support departments - responsi-
bility centers that do not directly serve the clientele of the
organization or work in its production line but that service other'
departments. In a city, such departments include finance, planning,
legal offices, data processing as well as administrative staff.
In business organizations as well as governments, such responsi-
bility centers are usually controlled on an expense center basis -
they are controlled on total budget size and their output is assessed
on a subjective basis. In part this is justified. Often such depart-
ments are small and can therefore be directly controlled; many perform
operational control tasks of an extremely routine nature; some part of
the work of such departments is commonly staff work. For such staff
work there is one overriding measure of success in the city government
the vote. However, for other departments, the objectives of the
organization are clearly defined and efficient performance is agreed
upon. Here one such department of government is discussed - finance.
Other departments, such as planning and legal offices, do include more
staff functions than finance and are correspondingly less easy to
evaluate. Others such as data processing are considerably more easy
to evaluate.
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viii. Finance Department
a. The finance department of a city generally includes the following
offices:
Assessment of property taxes
Collection of tax revenues
Disbursement
Budgeting
Auditing
Purchasing
Capital funds management
Cash management
- Assessor's office
- Treasurer's office
- Treasurer's office
- Finance/Mayor's office
- Auditor's office
- Auditor's office
- Finance office
- Treasurer's office
These functions are almost identical to those in the finance and
comptroller's offices of business firms. As in most business firms the
finance function in cities is run on an expense center basis - no
attempt is made to control the function on the basis of its production
or its contribution to the mission departments of the city.
This is not necessarily the case in either the business firm or
the city. The finance department does provide services to other depart-
ments and have definite dimensions along which its performance can be
measured.
The chief difficulty lies In separating out the different levels
in measurement. Clearly the tax rate for the city Is a policy choice
for the legislature and the amount of debt supported capital expenditure
Is usually a matter for the legislature. Much information that should
be maintained to support these legislative decisions - credit rating,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
bond rating, average tax burden in the city - obviously comes under
the heading of information for social indicators. Jtherwise it is a
problem that research in finance is advancing rapidly and bringing
many of the decisions in the finance function into the operational
control sphere. This is particularly true of operating cash management
where (Brigham and Weston, 1971, ch. 11) there are now programmable
models for the whole cash management problem and several large businesses
have the cash management function entirely computerized with the only
human inputs being desired credit rating and imputed stretched payables
cost. Although at present no city has reported using such a system,
it may be that major cities will start to use these optimizing models
quite shortly. For the present the field is. in flux.
b. Statistics
1. Assessments
Most cities at present rely heavily on the property tax as a
source of revenues. In this function it Is usually a legal
requirement that assessments match as closely as possible
market value of, property. Accordingly the ratio of assessments
to fair market value should be collected by sampling periodically.
Likewise the assessor's office should report number of
appeals against assessment and number of appeals granted.
In addition as a workload measure for the department
number of parcels assessed and number of parcels in the city
should be reported.
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2. Cash Management
This Includes cash for the operating requi.ements of the city.
The finance department here is responsible for collecting
revenues and for disbursement, and for raising short term
loans and investing short-term revenue surpluses.
As mentioned above this area is the subject of an
Integrated cash management theory allowing optimization of the
cash flow - i.e. minimization of the costs of maintaining an
adequate cash balance for tye city. The chief data required for
this are the accounts receivable schedule; the accounts payable
schedule; and the interest costs and yield on short-term
security. A city not using these cash management models should
probably report at least interest costs as a percent of operat-
ing expenditures, average aae of accounts receivable, average
age of accounts payable, with internal disbursements broken
out by department.
3. Budgeting
As the chief tool of management control, budgeting itself is
subject to management control.
Firstly a budget involves a revenue forecast; the accuracy
of this can be checked quite accurately each year. Secondly a
budget should be timely and as far as possible finalized before
the beginning of the financial year. Although it is ideal
if budgets forecast revenue accurately, it is not necessary
that expenditures be forecasted accurately since unforeseen
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circumstances may arise which will cause each department to
increase or decrease its spending. Nevertheless, as a
minimum each department's spending variance should be
monitored even in budgets not based on output measures.
As a measure of the volume of work required in budgeting,
the number of responsibility centers submitting budget estimates
to the finance office should be reported. Fourthly, since
most cities are required to present balanced budgets, the balance of
revenues and expenditures should be reported.
4. Auditing
In most cities the audit function, the prevention of fraud,
has fairly limited operational functions. Prevention of fraud
is construed as the principal function of the audit division
rather than the detection of inefficiency.
As a minimum the audit division should report percent of
city's cash vouchers audited for fraudulence or negligence,
,percentage of these found to be in error, value of errors
detected, and total vouchers audited. In addition the delay
between issuing a voucher and its audit should be reported.
There are at present fairly adequate models for optimizing the
audit function in a city.
5. Purchasing
The efficiency of any purchasing function is measured as the
ratio of price actually paid to price which could have been
paid for materials of the same quality. The most satisfactory
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index would therefore be percentage cost - ratio of price
paid to market prices. For a purchasing department, the
ratios would have to include prices paid plus departmental
overhead. However, this index is idealized; rarely can it'
be computed or market prices measured objectively enough,
partly because of the variable volume of purchases, partly
because of the need to compare quality.
Surrogate measures are available. These include number
of purchase orders - which should be minimized; average amount
of each order and contract, maximized; number of regular and
emergency requisition, emergency minimized: average number of
competitive bids per contract, maximized; value volume of
purchases, as a workload; value of rejections as a percentage
of total purchases; in the case of a purchasing department,
the mission departments should reject few purchases, the
purchasing department should reject more; percentage of purchases
kmade under published specifications agreed to by mission
departments; ratio of cash discounts to total purchases,
maximized; ratio of cash discounts to discounts offered,
maximized; average number of days to fill requisitions, minimized.
These measures should provide accurate control on the
efficiency of purchasing by a purchasing department and some
control on departmental purchasing efficiency in a decentralized
government.
It should be noted though that the purchasing problem is
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part of the general area of research in requisitioning and
Inventory control models and as such is inc easingly an area
of programmable decision-making.
6. Capital Funds Management
The amount of debt supported by a city is normally a matter of
legislation or policy. Accordingly, reports on statistics such
as economic activity or gross product of the city are social
indicator statistics. However, the city should raise its debts
efficiently - it should raise its volume of debt at a price
consonant with debts of its risk. The city should therefore
publish the statistics that go into its bond rating and credit
rating - viz. debt burden total/gross product/gross tax revenues
average repayment schedule in order that comparisons with other
cities can be made.
Multi-variate measures
The measures described so far suggest how diverse the functions of
the finance departments in a city are. Yet these measures alone have
not measured several of the most important contributions that the
finance department can make to a city - for instance, in management
accounting the preparation of costs by programs and by responsibility
center. Such outputs are unlikely to be assessed for the finance
department without the use of a questionnaire measure with test
questions of the type: "can the full program costs of each school be
identified in conformance with cost accounting principles?", or "are econo-
mic forecasts for the city accurate to within 5,?".
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As yet no such questionnaire has been prepared. The ICMA volume
on the finance function ('Municipal Finance Administration', l62) is
notable in the ICMA series for recommending few of the performance
measures suggested here. The reports suggested are financial statements
and asset statements of little use in management control. This is
disappointing in that the finance function is one on which a strong
professional consensus with little pressure from outside groups should
prevail. This consensus in turn could be expressed in terms of definite
standards and objectives to he monitored.
c. Statistics Published in Budget Reports by 17 Major Cities
Measure Early '40's Late '50's Late '60's
1. Number of parcels 16 13 15
2. Number of appeals 2 3 3
*
3. Interest costs on short
term cash 1 -
4. Revenue estimate accuracy -
5. Vouchers audited 9 5 12
6. Purchasing measure - - -
7. Average repayment schedule - - -
*Note: These statistics could in some cases be calculated
from the city's financial statements. Here is
presented only the case where the finance department
specifically separated out the statistic, for
presentation in the budget reports.
It appears that the standard of management control reporting is
uniformly bad in finance departmen.ts. Even the format of financial
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reports is generally such that the-efficiency of financial management
cannot easily be estimated. Several cities publish no separate
reports for interest on short term debts versus interest on long
term debts, in the financial reports. The typical budget statement'
for the finance departments is one page per department with at most
a statement of numbers of staff employed.
It is disappointing that reporting is so poor since comparisons
between cities would otherwise be prolific - i.e. any city could find
a large sample of other cities with similar financial characteristics
and histories for efficiency comparisons. However, in all cases
reporting ignores this, and in many cases reports appear designed to
avoid this.
CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
An efficient organization is an organization which is producing
the maximum value possible with the resources available to it. The
problem of efficiency in an organization is crucially related to
translating the goals of administration and clients through the
various sub-units in the organization. It is essential to this that
the sub-units in the organization be rewarded in congruence with the
goals of the organization. In particular, they should be rewarded on
the basis of the ratio between the contribution they make to achieving
the goals of the organization and the resources entrusted to them.
In a small organization the terms of this ratio can be known on the
basis of quite informal assessments. In a larger organization,
informal information will not be sufficient, and more formal measures
are required of contribution to the goals of the organization and
resources employed.
The techniques of cost accounting to measure resources employed
are well understood. In a business firm, contribution to the goals of
the organization can be measured by virtually the same techniques.
However, in non-profit and government organizations, measuring contri-
bution to the goals of the organization is a very inadequately
explored technical problem. In actual non-profit and government
organizations the efficiency problem is solved only by using informal
information. The technical problem is to find suitable formal measures
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to supplement this informal information. The criteria for suitable
formal measures have been discussed in Chapter IV rf the thesis -
they are quite stringent.
PPBS contributed nothing to the solution of this problem.
Ideally, the goals of government would be fixed and consistent like
the goals of a profit-making firm, and the sub-goals of government
departments would all be mapped into these major goals. PPBS was
concerned with establishing this ideal state of fixed, consistent
goals. In doing so it overlooked the possibility that even before
the millenium when governments pursue consistent goals departments can
be measured by their contribution to the achievement of the inconsistent
goals that do exist. In Chapter iiI, it was suggested that the
management control process, Anthony's (1965) name for the process by
which administration ensures efficient managerial performance, can
be based on measurement of progress towards inconsistent goals, and
it can be based on quite informal structures of rewards and information
flows. In Chapter IV methods of measuring contribution to organizational
goals were reviewed. While highly sophisticated methods are available
for measuring total contribution to organizational goals, components
of contribution to goal achievement may be measured with quite primi-
tive methods, and yet, as Chapter III showed, the primitive measures may
sttll be useful complements in the management control process.
Chapter V reviewed, for each of the major departments of local
governments, some commonly proposed measures of contribution to the
goals of local governments. It was shown that for many departments, in
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particular for fire, police,library and for finance departments, a
measure of contribution to each of the goals for the department is
available. For other departments at least some of the goals had
corresponding measures.
Technically, therefore, it is feasible for local governments to
measure their production. The first four chapters of the thesis
stressed the normative implications of this: local governments should
measure the production of their mission departments and support
departments. The first four chapters went further than this: it
would be more rewarding at present to install management control
systems in local governments than to install PPB systems.
Yet Chapter V suggests a disappointingly different reality. With
few exceptions, measures suitable for use in management control systems
are absent from the budget documents of large cities, documents on a
crucial element in the management control process.
This is especially disappointing. It reflects a darker side to
the budgetary process, sketched by Wildavsky (1970), Lindblom (1963)
and other incrementalists. There is a strong reluctance within the
executive to accept control and appraisal. In Chapter V, the depart-
ments that stand out as reporting well - libraries, occasionally fire
departments, and education - are typically departments associated with
vigorous professional maintenance of public service and are not
necessarily those departments that have the most readily available
set of performance measures. Public health formerly had such a
professional system. With a recent decline in interest in maintenance
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of efficiency standards and a fragmentation of prof ssional review,
the result has been a decline.in reporting standards that is
particularly clear in the budget reports of the '40's and '50's.
(See Vaughan, 1972). Other departments for which measures are even
more readily available, finance and police for example, have virtually
no use of management control reporting.
The conclusion is pessimistic, but the priorities remain clear.
Analysis may occasionally offer radical gains in service against
great resistance, but the major gains in government will come from an
efficiency push in the area of incremental decisions.
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